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ABSTRACT 
 
For years the advent of the digital economy has left countries stumped 
in their attempt to tax income earned by foreign firms without physical 
presence within their jurisdiction. International organizations and their 
member countries have failed in their attempts to tweak the rules of the 
international tax regime and address these challenges presented by the 
digital economy. This article argues that such conservative approach 
could not work, and fundamental reform is inevitable. The article 
proposes a withholding tax solution, explaining its merits and 
demonstrating its superiority over alternative reforms proposed to date.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
Adaptability is key to survival.1 This famous Darwinist insight is apt, 
albeit metaphorically, for a contemporary analysis of the international tax 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  Insightful, even though often wrongfully attributed to Charles Darwin. See Darwin 
Correspondence Project, University of Cambridge, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/people/ 
about-darwin/six-things-darwin-never-said#quote1(last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
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regime.2 Legal norms are constantly challenged by developments in the 
human societies which they serve, and constantly face the choice between 
certainty and fitness, between stability and adaptability, and between 
tweaking and fundamental reforms. One could hardly think of a more 
dramatic change than the digital revolution we all face at the present,3 
changing our culture, our thinking, and our markets, naturally applying 
pressure on legal regimes to respond.4  
The international tax regime has struggled in face of this pressure. 
From radio waves to satellite-remitted content, from distant catalogue 
sales to electronic commerce, and cloud computing, the fundamental 
physical presence requirement for tax jurisdiction has become 
increasingly anachronistic.5 The current tax rules were designed for a 
long gone, pure bricks-and-mortar economy, one that has begun to 
change almost from the very beginning of the regime itself.6 As 
intangibles increasingly dominate cross-border trade, the traditional rules 
begin to struggle.7 This struggle is evolving into a crisis with the more 
recent advent of true digital transactions, in which “Signals, in effect, are 
selling signals.”8 Charles Kingson wrote one of the first, and still one of 
the most thoughtful and well-articulated scholarly articles on the taxation 
of digital transactions.9 Kingson identified the difficulties involved with 
international tax law reform and concluded that such reform would be 
inevitable due to the incompatibility between the international tax regime 
and the digital economy.10 
The path to reform has, however, been treacherous. Beyond the 
                                                                                                                     
 2.  Or, generally, to the contemporary business environment, see, e.g., Martin Reeves & 
Mike Deimler, Adaptability: The New Competitive Advantage, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 134 (2011). 
 3.  See, e.g., MARSHALL MCLUHAN & BRUCE R. POWERS, THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1989); DIRK HELBING, 
THINKING AHEAD—ESSAYS ON BIG DATA, DIGITAL REVOLUTION, AND PARTICIPATORY MARKET 
SOCIETY (2015). 
 4.  See, e.g., REINER SCHULZE & DIRK STAUDENMAYER, DIGITAL REVOLUTION: 
CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE (2016); Stanford Technology Law Review’s 2012 
Symposium: First Amendment Challenges in the Digital Age, available at https://law.stanford.edu 
/stanford-technology-law-review-stlr/stlr-past-symposia/#slsnav-2013 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019). 
 5.  Charles I. Kingson, The David Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing the Future, 51 TAX L. REV. 
641 (1996) [hereinafter Kingson, Taxing the Future]. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See, e.g., Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229 
(2014). 
 8.  Kingson, Taxing the Future, supra note 5, at 649. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. See also Chang Hee Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue 
Between Developed and Developing Countries, 4 J. KOREAN L. 19, 21 (2004) (“[D]igital 
technology completely destroys the economic and legal basis for the existing rules of international 
taxation, implying the necessity of a complete overhaul”).  
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natural resistance to reform, powerful stakeholders, led by the most 
developed world economies, understood that reform would entail loss of 
their controlling dominance of the international tax regime,11 dominance 
that allowed them to stack the odds in their favor in revenue terms.12 
Geopolitical changes, most notably the decline of the superpowers and 
the ascent of emerging economies, led by the BRICS countries,13 brought 
with them demand for reform of the international tax rules in favor of 
what they viewed as a fairer division of tax revenues. This change would 
increase the taxing rights of source (or market) economies where 
consumers or users reside,14 inevitably at the expense of the traditional 
powerful economies, in which most of the world capital and multinational 
enterprises (MNE) reside.15  
The demand for reform went beyond the digital economy, yet it 
coincided with its ascent and has been most clearly demonstrated in its 
context.16 The digital economy permits MNE (usually resident in a 
developed country) to fully operate in developing countries, taking 
advantage of their markets without physical presence and hence without 
sufficient taxable presence,17 giving a favorable (tax) outcome that would 
be much more difficult and costly to devise in most old economy 
contexts. Therefore, the digital economy presented taxpayers with 
                                                                                                                     
 11.  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (1999) 
(explaining that the regime is constructed around the network of bilateral tax treaties, essentially 
all of which are modeled after the OECD Model Tax Convention). The original acknowledgment 
of the existence of such a regime was in Avi-Yonah’s “The Structure of International Taxation: 
A Proposal for Simplification.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: 
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996).  
 12.  See, e.g., Pasquale Pistone & Yariv Brauner, Introduction, in THE BRICS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION (Pasquale Pistone & Yariv Brauner, eds., 
2015) [hereinafter Pistone & Brauner, THE BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX 
COORDINATION]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See, e.g., BEPS Monitoring Group, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy (Feb. 
2018), available at https://bepsmonitoringgroup.wordpress.com/tag/bmg/ (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019). 
 15.  See, e.g., Fortune, Visualize the Global 500, available at http://fortune.com 
/global500/visualizations/?iid=recirc_g500landing-zone1 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 16.  See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-9789264192744-en.htm. In 
this first BEPS document the OECD identified the “[a]pplication of treaty concepts to profits 
derived from the delivery of digital goods and services” as a key pressure area that must be 
addressed by the BEPS project, later reflected in action item 1. Id. at 47. 
 17.  See, e.g., Peter Hongler & Pasquale Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax 
Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy (WU Int’l Taxation Res. Paper Series No. 
2015-15, 2015),  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591829 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter 
Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the 
Digital Economy]. 
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opportunities to make their taxation largely elective.18  
Such tax planning flexibility affects not only developing countries but 
also developed countries that have been starving for revenue and 
struggling to protect their tax base, even prior to the global financial crisis 
of the early 2000s.19 The outcome of the crisis was a sufficient similarity 
of interests among most nations, whose politicians demanded change and 
reform in what evolved into the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
project, of which, its primary goal was a solution to the tax challenges 
presented by the digital economy.20 The inherent complexity of the issue 
was exacerbated by the BEPS’s duality of purposes: to maximize 
collection of taxes from MNE, likely favoring the more developed 
countries; and a reform to the fundamental tax base division rules, likely 
in favor of the less developed countries.21  
Therefore, despite the demand of politicians for reform, the BEPS 
representatives of countries with diverse and often conflicting interests 
found it difficult to agree on the content of the reform, strengthening the 
conservative voices whose energy was devoted to the discrediting of any 
reform proposals and building on the necessary imperfection of any 
proposal, which  seemed par for the course in any complex and novel 
matter. Even at the present, more than two decades after Kingson’s 
article, serious scholars still question the wisdom of reform, advocating 
alternatively a more traditional avenue of tweaking the existing rules and 
applying them by analogy to the new economy and digital transactions.22 
This conservative approach cannot prevail. It has been aggressively tried 
and failed in recent decades.23 This Article demonstrates this conclusion, 
                                                                                                                     
 18.  See OECD, BEPS website, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) 
(describing the BEPS Project).  
 19.  A process that started even earlier as a result of globalization as explained by Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000). 
 20.  An important initial discussion of these matters took place within the G8 organization. 
See, e.g., Prime Minister's Office & Cabinet Office, G8 factsheet: tax, GOV.UK (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-factsheet-tax/g8-factsheet-tax. It eventually led 
to the G20 organization’s charge of the OECD with what became the BEPS project. See G20, G20 
Leaders Declaration, at T48, G20 at Los Cabos, Mexico (June 18-19, 2012), https://www.g20.org/ 
sites/default/files/g2Oresources/library/G20_LeadersDeclarationFinalLosCabos.pdf. See also 
OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 16 (the original OECD 
BEPS document). 
 21.  See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014) [hereinafter 
Brauner, What the BEPS]. 
 22.  Most notably, Wolfgang Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the 
Digitalized Economy, 72 BULL. INT’L TAX. 278 (2018) [hereinafter Schön, Ten Questions about 
Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy]. 
 23.  See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter 
OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING] (discussing the BEPS project and 
the positioning of this issue as the project’s first action item). For the project’s final, not yet 
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making, as its first contribution, the case for reform and explaining why 
reform is both desirable and inevitable. 
The second contribution of this Article is an analysis of the various 
reform proposals considered in recent years and the assessment of the 
circumstances required for their success. Many prescriptions for 
international tax reform have been presented in recent years, yet at their 
core they belong to two groups:24 (1) collaborative solutions, featuring a 
new rule that would permit taxation of digital profits by the market 
economies even when the taxpayers earning such profits lack physical 
presence within their jurisdictions (a “virtual PE” solution, often referred 
to as the nexus-based approach),25 and (2) solutions based on actions by 
said market economies to tax digital presence within their jurisdiction in 
a “rough justice” manner, reducing the benefits of unacceptable tax 
planning by using BEPS through withholding taxes and equalization 
levies.26  
This Article advocates in favor of a withholding tax solution, arguing 
that it is superior to all other alternatives in the current environment. Such 
analysis is the third and primary contribution of this Article. The specific 
proposed solution does not ring-fence the digital economy, but avoids 
controversial, difficult to devise definitions, providing more taxing 
opportunities for source jurisdictions (and therefore a fairer allocation of 
global taxing rights). It would directly target base erosion and focus on 
                                                                                                                     
conclusive report, see OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-the-tax-challeng 
es-of-the-digital-economy-action-1-2015-final-report-9789264241046-en.htm [hereinafter 
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL 
REPORT]. For information on the OECD’s continuous effort on the matter, see OECD, TAX 
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-interim-report-97892642930 
83-en.htm. 
 24.  This Article assumes that whatever reform is adopted, the general framework of 
taxation will be kept as-is (i.e., taxation will remain at the exclusive power of nation-states and 
such states will continue to use multiple types of taxes in an uncoordinated manner), particularly 
preserving stand-alone income (and corporate income) taxes. 
 25.  See, e.g., Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income 
in the Era of the Digital Economy, supra note 17 (giving a concrete proposal for reform of the 
current PE rules, expanding them to include virtual presence); OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX 
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 107-
13; OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 
23, at 135-39. 
 26.  See, e.g., Andrés Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 
1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, (IBFD, White Paper Series 33, 2015) 
[hereinafter Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper]; 
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 23, at 113-15 (withholding solution) & 115-17 (equalization levy); OECD, 
TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 139-
40 (withholding taxes) & 139-44 (turnover taxes, including equalization levies). 
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the biggest ticket items involving the largest amount of taxes, doing so 
without fundamental violations of the current bases of the international 
tax regime. This Article demonstrates that the withholding tax solution is 
superior to the virtual PE solution, which relies on difficult-to-envision 
agreements of many countries on the factors that establish the virtual 
presence and on controversial definitions of the digital economy to which 
it applies, which in effect ring-fences the digital economy against the 
agreement of BEPS stakeholders.27 Furthermore, a nexus-based approach 
requires difficult attribution of profits to a non-physical PE, a very 
complex exercise within the current framework of the international tax 
regime. In this regard, this Article adds that the withholding solution may 
also be developed as a remedial tool to adequately implement the nexus-
based approach if adopted. This Article rejects equalization levies and 
similar solutions presented as interim measures, because such solutions 
undermine the existing international tax regime and its nontrivial 
achievements to date, portraying an unrealistic picture of temporariness, 
and ring-fencing the digital economy or parts of it while not addressing 
the key issues of BEPS.  
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part I presents the 
withholding solution advocated by this Article, its advantages, and key 
design issues it presents. Part II demonstrates that fundamental reform of 
the tax rules applicable to cross-border digital transactions is necessary, 
rejecting the alternative of further tweaking of the current rules. Once the 
necessity of reform is established, Part III discusses alternatives to the 
proposal made by this article and actual country responses based on these 
alternatives, evaluating them and explaining why they are less desirable 
than the proposal advocated by this Article.  
I. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: WITHHOLDING ON 
DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS 
A. The Proposal 
This Article argues that in the current circumstances the international 
tax regime should optimally adopt the withholding solution proposed in 
this Part.28 The core proposal is to design a standard low rated final 
withholding tax on all base-eroding payments to non-residents,29 with 
                                                                                                                     
 27.  See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 11. 
 28.  An early version of the proposal was advocated during the BEPS project by Báez 
Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper, supra note 26. 
 29.  The White Paper, suggested a rate of 10%, yet for the purposes of the proposal the 
exact rate is immaterial, so long as it is sufficiently low (perhaps in the 3%-10% range), widely 
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specific standard exemptions from such withholding tax for payments 
made to payees registered to be domestically taxed under the normal net 
taxation scheme.30 Withholding or other tax arrangements that are already 
in place,31 (provided by domestic law32 or by treaties33) should prevail 
over the new tax and consequently left intact. Most of the common 
international tax rules, such as those applicable to wages, dividends, 
rents, and interest paid to non-residents, will continue to apply as 
prescribed by the domestic law of the source country as amended by an 
applicable tax treaty if any. 
All other payments (i.e., business related, perhaps some falling-
through-the-cracks payments, and base-eroding payments) will be 
subject to the proposed, low withholding tax. The implementation (and 
enforcement) of the tax will be done primarily with the help of a 
corresponding rule that will require all business expenses to be matched 
with a specific withholding tax (applicable, but not necessarily collected 
at a rate above zero) or a specific exemption to be deductible. Each 
deduction will require therefore an identified destination (payee ID and 
residence)34 and an identified payment. Payments to unidentified payees 
or to resident payees resident in non-cooperating jurisdictions should 
incur a higher than standard withholding tax.35 
Non base-eroding payments are a secondary concern of this Article, 
because the primary challenge that they present to the current tax regime 
is administrative. This Article, nevertheless, proposes to apply the same 
taxing rules to these payments. Yet, because the primary administrative 
challenge that they present is the ineffectiveness of customers, usually 
individual, non-business customers who make the bulk of these payments 
(think withholding agents like Amazon or Ebay) this Article argues that 
the most plausible withholding agents in such cases must be the 
facilitators of these payments (i.e., credit card and similar financial 
                                                                                                                     
accepted and neutral in the sense that it is not extrapolated from actual, currently imposed net 
taxation rates.  
 30.  The intellectual origins of this paper are in Richard Doernberg, Electronic Commerce 
and International Tax Sharing, 16 TAX NOTES INT’L 1013 (1998).  
 31.  Such as the taxation of income attributable to PE in the source/payment state. 
 32.  Such as the withholding on wages. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 1441 & 3401-06 (the U.S. rules 
that resemble most countries’ rules).  
 33.  See, e.g., 2017 OECD Model art. 10(2) (capping domestic withholding on dividend 
payments at 5% or 15%). 
 34.  Beneficial ownership rules may need to be adapted to the new tax, yet their operation 
should be no different than it is under the current rules. 
 35.  The White Paper suggested a rate of 15%, yet again, the exact rate is immaterial, so 
long as it is sufficiently higher than the withholding tax rate applicable to payments made to 
participating jurisdictions. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, 
White Paper, supra note 26. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347503 
2019] TAXING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY POST BEPS . . .  SERIOUSLY 9 
 
institutions).36 The burden that such rule will add to these regulated 
institutions does not seem to be excessive as they already possess 
essentially all relevant information.37 Note that because these payments 
are not base-eroding, countries will more easily be able to negotiate 
different deals among themselves, reducing or even eliminating the 
withholding tax, effectively converting the role of the financial 
institutions in such cases to information gathering agents, a role that they 
already regularly perform.  
The rest of this Article will focus on the first part of the proposal that 
applies to base-eroding payments, which is the primary contribution of 
this Article. This proposal addresses the key concerns raised by the 
advent of the digital economy and the BEPS project: insufficient or 
difficult to collect source taxation, base erosion, and the lack of consensus 
(and perhaps will) among nations to more tightly coordinate their taxation 
of MNE. The focus on base-eroding payments is the core of the proposal, 
stemming from the centrality of these payments to tax planning of the 
kind targeted by the BEPS project (and generally by all productive, non-
haven countries), yet also realizing that such payments, mainly made in 
Business-to-Business (B2B) transactions, are the most significant in 
terms of revenue and impact.38 Next, this Part begins to make the case for 
the proposal with an explanation of the importance of its focus on B2B 
payments.  
B. Key Advantages of the Withholding Solution 
1. Focus on B2B 
Meeting the challenges presented by the digital economy is vital for 
the stability of the international tax regime, few could ignore that, yet the 
exact focus of the desired reform is more controversial. The current 
discourse has been enveloped in the BEPS project, enjoying the benefits 
of political support but at the same time being handcuffed by the rhetoric 
that comes hand in hand with such support. It was easy to focus on the 
                                                                                                                     
 36.  Intermediation services, such as Uber or Booking may equally serve this purpose, 
would require a rule that would easily identify them and coordinate their obligations with those 
of the financial institutions.  
 37. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service, for example, already requires credit card companies 
and similar third parties to report various types of transactions that they facilitate. See, e.g., IRS 
website, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/third-party-reporting-information-center-informa 
tion-documents (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 38.  Consumer-to-Business (C2B) and Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C) payments do not 
erode the tax base of the source countries since they are not typically deductible. They are also 
dwarfed by cross-border B2B transactions. See, e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDE TO MEASURING THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 204 (2011); OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 55. 
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most famous, largest MNE, household names in every house. For the 
media, which very much made BEPS a reality, it was particularly easy to 
highlight a lack of source taxation that almost everybody in the world 
could identify with, because almost everybody had been knowingly 
guilty of not paying taxes on personal online purchases. Much of the 
discourse, therefore used the Amazon or eBay purchases narrative, 
directly or indirectly in the discussion and consequently in the design of 
reform proposals.39 Policymakers followed to this discourse, refraining 
from making a critical distinction between B2B and Business-to-
Consumer (B2C) (or Customer-to-Customer (C2C))40 digital 
transactions, despite the important differences in the type of transactions. 
The lack of concern about base erosion where the latter are concerned 
being one very relevant difference. This Article argues that this confusion 
between media worthiness and salience led some of the discourse astray, 
alternatively proposing to discuss the two business forms separately, and 
primarily target B2B transactions that dominate the digital economy and 
present the most severe BEPS challenges. 
The B2B model dominates the digital economy and is expected to 
continue to do so despite the projected growth in both B2C and C2C.41 
B2B payments present therefore the biggest challenge to the international 
tax regime, beyond their base-eroding properties, being the largest in 
terms of both nominal magnitude and revenue potential, and at the same 
time the most complex, and hence difficult to track and analyze, because 
they are often among related parties or part of complex corporate business 
relationship, and not merely an individual purchasing a book on 
amazon.com with a credit card. The good news is that experience with 
early ecommerce demonstrates that self-reporting and withholding 
obligations were much more effective in the B2B context, especially 
when the payer benefits from a tax deduction for the payment (a more 
common than not reality in B2B), than in the B2C context. We all know 
the ineffectiveness of similar measures when imposed on final individual 
consumers. The withholding solution is the only existing alternative that 
discerns between these easily distinguishable sectors of the digital 
economy and provides solutions tailor-made to each, focusing on salience 
rather than on the media worthiness of the challenges. 
                                                                                                                     
 39.  See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, annex B (Typical Tax Planning Structures in 
Integrated Business Models). 
 40.  As explained below, this Article argues that for its purposes the differences between 
B2C and C2C are substantively unimportant and administratively minor and therefore it discusses 
them together.  
 41.  See supra text accompanying note 38. 
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2. Focus on Base-Eroding Payments 
The precise focus of the proposed solution is on base-eroding 
payments. This focus goes hand in hand with its enforcement mechanism 
and the unique legitimacy and efficacy benefits of the proposal. The 
BEPS project made base erosion its primary target. Although profit 
shifting is also a key target of the project it comes in different varieties, 
not all of which benefit from the same support. Shifting from residence 
countries to “havens” is “in,” yet shifting away from source countries is 
much less so. Base erosion is presented by the BEPS project as 
inappropriate and worthy of fighting because of the arbitrage opportunity 
it presents: reducing usually high tax in a productive jurisdiction without 
actual taxation anywhere; this result annihilates the reason for the 
deduction (generation of “more,” typically taxable income) and violates 
the matching principle—between deductions and income. The idea is that 
successful productive activity cannot end up not taxed anywhere, a 
fortiori not reducing the overall effective taxation. The Withholding 
solution is the only alternative directly targeting the harm (base erosion) 
that BEPS alleges to prevent. 
3. The Proposed Solution Avoids the Addition 
of Problematic Definitions 
The BEPS work on Action 1 struggled to define the digital economy. 
Reading most of the work on this topic, one gets the impression that the 
preferred approach is to use a mechanism of the “smell test” sort to 
identify digital economy issues. This may be useful, especially in a 
preliminary investigative stage such as the one in which the BEPS Project 
is currently engaged. However, it would be problematic if one were to 
impose an actual tax on digital transactions. This is particularly important 
for withholding taxes, which to be successful depends on a reasonably 
clearly defined target or payment. A reasonably clearly defined target or 
payment is required because otherwise withholding agents, upon whom 
compliance with the rules is critical to their efficacy, are unlikely to act 
optimally. They may overwithhold simply to relieve themselves of any 
potential liability. Such behavior would result in undue hardship for 
investors and thereby hinder the digital economy, which is clearly 
something the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) is careful not to do. Withholding agents might also 
underwithhold, succumbing to pressure applied by the taxpayer based on 
the vagueness of the definition, naturally defeating the purpose of the 
rule. Therefore, for a definition to be useful, it needs to be reasonably 
clear. 
The definition must also be standard. The core of the current 
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difficulties faced by the international tax regime, leading to the BEPS 
Project, was the variety of different, uncoordinated domestic law 
responses to the same international tax issues. Furthermore, the definition 
must correspond to the purpose of the rule using the definition—the 
imposition of a withholding tax mechanism. It would therefore be futile, 
for example, to rely on a generally accurate, dictionary-style definition if 
it cannot be appropriately used to identify when one should or should not 
withhold. These three conditions seem obvious, yet a quick review of the 
literature on the taxation of the digital economy reveals that little 
attention was paid to them in recent years. 
The term “digital economy” is often traced to a 1997 book titled The 
Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked 
Intelligence.42 As of yet, a useful, universal legal definition has yet to be 
produced (by that book or elsewhere). In an often-cited work, Australia 
defined the digital economy as “the global network of economic and 
social activities that are enabled by platforms such as the Internet, mobile 
and sensor networks.”43 This is an example of a rather useful dictionary 
definition that cannot be used for our purposes. One could imagine a 
paraphrase of such definition such as “all payments in connection with 
economic and social activities that are enabled by platforms such as the 
Internet, mobile and sensor networks.” The problem with this definition 
is that it is probably both over- and under-inclusive.  
A lot of payments, perhaps even most business payments, relate in 
some way or other to digital economy networks and it may be difficult to 
determine when this relation is sufficient to mandate withholding. 
Moreover, payments are often made with remote connection to digital 
products but with immediate connection to non-digital products in 
circumstances where the payor (and definitely the payee) are unaware of 
the connection. Such circumstances may indicate an appropriate 
circumstance for nonwithholding, yet it would be difficult to draw the 
line here and to distinguish true and merely declared ignorance in these 
cases. The definition may be underinclusive since it mentions particular 
platforms that may not be exhaustive even at present and are unlikely to 
be so in future. The use of nonexclusive language (“such as”) provides 
little remedy because it is too general and likely to end up being too vague 
                                                                                                                     
 42. DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE AGE OF 
NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE (1997). 
 43. Australian Government, Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy, What is the digital economy?, available at http://www.dbcde.gov.au/digital_economy/ 
what_is_the_digital_economy (accessed  July 9, 2012),  cited in Jinyan Li, Protecting the Tax 
Base in the Digital Economy, Papers on Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing 
Countries, Draft Paper No. 9, June 2014: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP/Paper9_Li.pdf 
(accessed Nov. 1, 2014). 
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and useless again. Other proposals do not fare better.44 
Unable to satisfactorily define the digital economy, one may limit the 
definition to its most important applications. Indeed, to date, most of the 
work in this context had been done on electronic commerce.45 Alas, that 
work focused on the redefinition of the PE notion to include digital 
presence. Such redefinition is not helpful for the purposes of this Part if 
we wish to use it to impose a withholding tax that does not require a PE 
to be established. In 2011, the OECD came up with: “An electronic 
transaction is the sale or purchase of goods or services, conducted over 
computer networks by methods specifically designed for the purpose of 
receiving or placing of orders.”46 This definition is too limited since it 
does not adequately address digital goods and services. 
This Article does not argue that a pragmatic approach could not reach 
a workable definition. An instrumental definition that would emphasize 
precision, even at the expense of limiting the scope, could work, perhaps 
through the use of specific platforms, yet with the understanding that the 
evolution of the digital economy may quickly make these platforms 
obsolete. A mechanism to update and improve the definition would have 
to be put in place to make it workable and address this issue in the 
future.47 Nonetheless, this Article argues that the withholding solution 
presents a unique opportunity as the only alternative that does not 
necessitate reliance on imperfect definitions. The withholding solution 
proposed by this Article is to simply tax all that is currently not regulated, 
all base-eroding payments that are not already covered by existing rules, 
and therefore, it directly targets base erosion and profit shifting in the 
digital economy.  
4. No Ring-Fencing 
A direct consequence of the unique approach of the proposed 
withholding solution is that it does not ring-fence the digital economy, 
equally targeting non-digital base-eroding payments that are not currently 
taxed or explicitly exempted at source. The BEPS work, following 
essentially all of the experts in the field, has consistently made the non-
ring-fencing a condition for a workable solution to the challenges 
presented by the digital economy.48 At the moment, the withholding 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., OECD definition from 2012: “The digital economy is comprised of markets 
based on digital technologies that facilitate the trade of goods and services through e-commerce,” 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/The-Digital-Economy-2012.pdf, at 5. 
 45.  Most notably OECD Model Commentary on Art. 5, ¶¶ 122-131. 
 46.  See OECD, GUIDE TO MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 38, at 72. 
 47.  See discussion in Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, 
White Paper, supra note 26.  
 48.  See supra text accompanying note 27.  
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solution proposed by this Article is the only alternative meeting this 
condition.49  
5. More Taxation at Source 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the withholding solution is 
that it also meets head-on the goal of increasing taxation at the source. 
This is an acknowledged goal of the BEPS project, yet one that remains 
challenged and only partially attained by the project.50 There should be 
little doubt that BEPS was originally driven inter alia by the demand of 
source jurisdictions, and most importantly by the demands of China and 
India for expanded taxing rights at the source for so-called market 
economies.51  
To date these demands have achieved little, resulting in a renewed 
push in the context of the digital economy framed in different ways, most 
importantly based on “user participation” as a justification for more 
taxation at the source.52 The discussion of this justification has been 
complex and fraught with competing arguments that are difficult to 
balance, a task that is beyond the scope of this Article. Because the 
withholding solution does not require a particular justification for taxing 
transactions at the source, it directly meets the goal of more taxation at 
the source, providing the balance between source and residence taxation 
through the recommended low rate of withholding tax.  
                                                                                                                     
 49.  The only other proposal potentially compliant with this condition may be the U.S. 
marketing intangible based proposal, yet this proposal has not yet been made public and the 
assessment of whether it will or not ring fence the digital economy depends on the details of the 
proposals.  
 50.  See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 16, at 
35-36; Brauner, What the BEPS, supra note 21, at 111-12. 
 51.  See, e.g., Pistone & Brauner, THE BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX 
COORDINATION, supra note 12, at 4-5; Manoj Kumar Singh, Taxation of the Digital Economy: An 
Indian Perspective, 45 INTERTAX 467 (2017); Diheng Xu, The Convergence and Divergence 
Between China’s Implementation and OECD/G20 BEPS Minimum Standards, 3 WORLD TAX J. 
471, 482-84 (2018) (examining the conflict over so-called “location-specific” advantages). 
 52.  See, e.g., OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 
2018, supra note 23; Stephanie Soong Johnston, India’s Tax Chief: Digital Taxation Needs Fair 
Allocation Rules, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 435 (2018); Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, Taxing 
Where Value is Created: What’s ‘User Involvement’ Got to Do with It?, 47 INTERTAX 161 (2019) 
[hereinafter Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created]; HM Treasury, Corporate Tax 
and the Digital Economy: Position Paper Update (Mar. 2018), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/689240/corporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 
2019). 
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6. Playing within the Rules of the Game 
International taxation is a conservative field and reforms of the 
international tax regime are particularly cautious in nature and therefore 
gradual reforms that are easily reconcilable with the current rules of the 
game are more likely to gain consideration, support, and eventually 
legitimacy. This Article further seeks to accept the basic conditions 
provided by the BEPS project in the design of its recommendations, the 
most important of which is the preservation to the extent possible of the 
corporate tax and the fundamental bases of the regime itself to preserve 
the stability and achievements of the regime to date. It is impossible to 
completely avoid innovation if one genuinely wishes to face the 
challenges that the digital economy presents to the international tax 
regime,53 a conclusion supported by the original BEPS documents.54  
However, it is possible to do so with minimal incoherence as 
demonstrated by the withholding solution. All the elements of the 
withholding solution are familiar components of the current international 
tax regime: withholding tax obligations, denial of deduction on base-
eroding payments, registration in source jurisdictions, and information 
reporting. Moreover, to the extent possible (and desired by the countries 
involved) the withholding solution preserves all the current regime’s 
taxing rules by exempting them from the proposed withholding tax, 
leaving it applicable only to untaxed (or unreported) base-eroding 
payments. The law and treaty changes required should be minimal and 
focused, further demonstrating its compatibility with the current regime. 
Finally, the proposal operates within the current regime, unlike certain 
proposals, such as equalization levies that purport to operate outside the 
regime by adding a tax (the levy in this case) to the mix, claiming 
disingenuously, that it is external to the current international tax regime 
and hence not in conflict with its rules.55  
7. The Proposed Solution is Feasible: Unilaterally or 
Multilateral Adoption 
BEPS action 1 and the following OECD/inclusive framework output 
related to the taxation of the digital economy make it difficult to predict 
which course stakeholders may take, since their actions to date included 
inconsistent leaps from one idea to another without follow up research on 
any single proposal.56 A realistic proposal feasibility should be tested 
                                                                                                                     
 53.  See infra Part II. 
 54.  See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 23, 
at 20. 
 55.  See infra Part III.B. 
 56.  See also Yariv Brauner, Editorial: Developments on the Digital Economy Front – 
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under different scenarios to see if the withholding solution withstands 
such a test. It could be adopted both unilaterally and multilaterally (under 
various possible options) with little impact on its desirability to the 
adopter.  
Unilateral adoption of the solution is straightforward, because it 
merely requires the enactment of the proposed solution, and, if relevant, 
adaptation of treaties to accommodate the solution.57 Unilateral actions 
in response to the use of the digital economy to undermine domestic tax 
bases is already prevalent, through the use of multiple measures, typically 
inferior to the withholding solution.58 The main disadvantage of a 
unilateral solution would be the reduced incentive for other countries to 
cooperate in the provision of information required for effective 
implementation of the proposal. This may result in relatively high rates 
of tax (although in the unilateral scenario the implementing country fully 
controls the rate) and a concern about foreign investment. Another 
equally plausible scenario may be positive registration of foreign 
investors with the implementing country to avoid higher taxation. A 
concern may arise about the ease of tax treaty negotiation and even about 
relief of double taxation for the withholding tax, but unilateral adoption 
is likely to occur in a world (not much different than the one we currently 
live in) fraught with uncoordinated unilateral responses of productive 
states to BEPS by digital MNE, aligning the interests of most countries, 
and reducing the risks mentioned. Nonetheless, a coordinated, 
multilateral adoption of the withholding solution more directly relieves 
these concerns, because all of the involved parties would have an obvious 
interest in standardization, coordinated relief of double taxation, and the 
presentation of a single front against non-cooperating countries and their 
residents.  
Finally, one may doubt the possibility of collective action in this 
context, especially in light of the unproductive BEPS process regarding 
the digital economy, yet the withholding solution presents an opportunity 
for a smaller number of countries to cooperate, achieving many of the 
advantages of multilateral adoption, and, in addition, the advantage of the 
first adopter with a voice, the power to determine the future course of the 
solution. One can draw an analogy to the process that led to the adoption 
of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) to demonstrate how a 
comprehensive, flexible solution could quickly attract the attention of 
many countries, despite potential conflict with perceived maximization 
of interests of such countries. Technically the multilateral solution is 
quite similar to the unilateral solution, the sole difference is in the 
                                                                                                                     
Progress or Regression?, INTERTAX (forthcoming, 2019). 
57.  See infra Part I.D. Indeed, countries following UN Model article 12A have already 
amended treaties with such a provision. 
 58.  See infra Part III. 
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standardization of the mechanism for the adoption of such legislation (a 
multilateral rather than bilateral, or no treaty). Naturally, multilateral 
adoption may follow initial unilateral adoption by multiple countries; 
again, the process should have no effect on the operation of the solution.  
8. Interim Conclusion 
In conclusion, the withholding solution proposed by this Article meets 
all the requirements from a solution to the challenges presented by the 
digital economy to the international tax regime made by the BEPS project 
and general policy considerations. This Article argues and further 
demonstrates that in the case of some of these requirements the 
withholding solution is the only alternative that meets them, leading to 
the conclusion that it is superior to all other alternatives. 
C. Design Issues 
The digital economy presents not only new business models that 
conceptually challenge current tax rules, but also severe practical 
challenges to the ability of governments to collect revenue. In many 
cases, governments simply have not been collecting revenue from the 
digital economy,59 and in others the collection fell short, triggering inter 
alia the BEPS Project.60 Administration of measures to tax the digital 
economy is therefore paramount, requiring special care with the design 
of such measures. 
1. Rates 
Unlike normal tax rates that reflect the political choices of nation 
states, the rate of tax imposed by the withholding solution should 
preferably be internationally standard and set. This is because the purpose 
of the tax is to set a fair and legitimate standard for division of revenue 
among residence and source states. The digital economy discourse raised 
several more complex mechanisms, yet it is important to understand that 
the choice of a withholding tax to tackle the challenges presented by the 
digital economy means a preference for a simple and somewhat crude 
solution, and a view of reality where international collaboration is 
minimal (in comparison to the digital PE approach, for example).  
It is likely that in the large majority of cases the tax would simply 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See, e.g., the moratorium on taxation of the Internet. This is the U.S. “Internet Tax 
Freedom Act” that was first passed by Congress in 1998 and has since been extended several 
times. 
 60. See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 23, 
20. 
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mean that the source state collects and keeps it, no more, no less, and 
therefore the rate should reflect an appropriate share of the tax base 
allocated to the source state. It should be sufficiently high, viewed as a 
final tax shadowing the corporate tax. Another reason to keep it 
sufficiently high would be to satisfy its base erosion role.  
The rate should also be kept sufficiently low, to satisfy the residence 
countries that control the international tax regime at the present and hence 
may perceive the withholding tax as a concession they make in favor of 
source jurisdictions. This argument is quite weak since the residence 
jurisdictions have not been collecting on this tax base much in the first 
place, yet politically it may be viewed as powerful. A more significant 
reason not to set the rate too high would be to reduce the incentives to 
evade it. Note, however, that the latter is not an optimization argument, 
since it is likely that taxpayers will continue to have incentives to attempt 
avoidance or evasion of the tax at any acceptable level (one could study 
this point in more depth, but it is beyond the scope of this Article). It is 
rather an argument based on the aspiration to design the tax according to 
its purpose and keep it at a level that would be generally perceived as fair 
and legitimate by the largest number of countries possible. Furthermore, 
the tax should be kept at a level that would not significantly hamper cross-
border business. 
Taking all this into account, the rate should be anywhere between 5% 
(that may be viewed as insignificant by source jurisdictions as this is a 
rate often charged by accommodating conduit jurisdictions for treaty 
shopping accommodation) and 15% (a level close to the actual net 
corporate tax rate in some jurisdictions). Therefore, 10% comes to mind 
to make calculations simple, but of course this is not a magic number and 
it could be negotiated up or down without qualitatively changing the 
proposal. 
Additionally, another rate should be used to address payments to 
noncompliant jurisdictions. It is well known that it is difficult to define 
tax havens, yet for the purposes of this proposal that inherently embodies 
a choice for a simple, perhaps imperfect solution, it is clear that a simple 
line should be drawn. The same 15% corporate tax rate comes to mind, 
but, again, the threshold rate could be a little higher or lower with little 
effect on this proposal. The elevated withholding tax rate should match. 
The proposal should therefore impose an elevated (perhaps 15%) 
withholding tax on payments to non-registered payees, including payees 
resident in jurisdictions with a corporate tax rate below 15%. Note that a 
PE of a resident of a sub-15% jurisdiction in a non-sub 15% jurisdiction 
should be eligible to register as such and enjoy the lower rate. Also note 
that the tax rate does not address effective tax rate reductions. This is 
partly to keep the solution simple and easily workable, and partly because 
harmful tax competition issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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2. Exemptions 
A full description of exemptions from the withholding solution is 
beyond the scope of this Article. The basic idea is to capture all payments 
not subject to a taxing rule at the present (with a strong preference for 
capturing base-eroding payments) with as little disruption as possible to 
the current rules of the international tax regime (reflecting the 
conservative evolutionary approach), and without resort to definitions of 
digital payments. 
Therefore, low-risk payments to identifiable taxpayers already taxed 
on a net basis should be exempt. The most obvious examples would be 
wages and deductible payments made to PE (in the same country). These 
payments do not present a classification difficulty because they are easily 
and clearly distinguished from other payments, and they are already 
subject to unique tax regimes (typically employer withholding in the case 
of wages and regular net corporate taxation in the case of PE) with little 
concern about abuse by manipulation of classifications. 
Interest and dividend payments (but not royalties) should similarly be 
exempt. Dividends are not generally base-eroding payments and are 
usually controlled by Article 10 of bilateral tax treaties. As such, they 
present no unique problem from the perspective of the digital economy.61 
Interest payments are base-eroding payments, yet, they do not present any 
unique challenges in the context of payments related to the digital 
economy.62 
All other business payments, including royalties,63 will be subject to 
the withholding tax unless countries believe that they are clearly beyond 
the scope of the digital economy. For example, payment for the rental of 
equipment, land or buildings, or for their purchase, payment for material 
and payments for services entailing individuals present on-site. The 
construction of a list of standard payments should not be complex.  
                                                                                                                     
 61.  Hybrid arrangements may present challenges for dividend payments, yet these are not 
unique to the digital economy and are dealt with, to the extent possible, by BEPS Action 2, and 
hence are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 62.  Limitation on interest deductions are handled by BEPS Action 4, and many countries’ 
implementation of its recommendation. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163(j) (replacing the former earning 
stripping rule with the standard set by BEPS Action 4). 
 63. One could argue that so-called “literary” royalties should remain within the scope of tax 
treaties’ Art. 12, yet we do not see the theoretical support for the distinction between royalties and 
business profits, especially in the context of the digital economy. In any event, if countries insist 
on that, Art. 12 may simply be left intact or amended to whatever scope countries wish. This 
action may create an area of uncertainty and open an opportunity for taxpayers to more 
aggressively include as many payments as possible within the scope of Art. 12. In the authors’ 
view, this is inappropriate, yet it does not interfere with the analysis of the withholding solution 
and its superiority to alternative solutions for taxing the digital economy; a fundamental axiom of 
the international tax regime is that it never obligates a country to tax where it does not wish to do 
so. 
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There may be some controversial payments, but if their treatment 
follows the principles set out above, the method should be fairly non-
controversial. These miscellaneous payments, clearly not digital 
economy payments, may be more susceptible to manipulation than the 
other exemptions. Taxpayers would have a clear incentive to inflate these 
payments, perhaps at the expense of other (closer to the digital economy) 
payments. However, the scale of abuse should be lower than any 
definition-based mechanism that would not be based on a widely scoped 
withholding tax.  
First, because such payments are already subject to other tax 
safeguards, such as the transfer pricing rules. Second, the country of the 
payor would have the strongest incentive to ensure that exempt payments 
are not inflated. As a market country, it is also in the best position to 
monitor the application of the rules: the payment is likely made within its 
jurisdiction, it is its tax base that is eroded and the payor (who is the 
withholding agent, not the taxpayer) is under its control.  
The most difficult cases are likely to be base-eroding payments for 
mixed equipment bundled with software, such as computerized 
machinery. The difficulty would be to allocate the appropriate price to 
each component, yet, every country already faces similar issues, typically 
requiring delineation of payments to the appropriate categories and 
treating truly bundled products or products where a certain piece (e.g., 
the software) is deminimis as a single property belonging to the dominant 
category (typically equipment in this context) or the category that more 
easily fits into the standard tax analysis, and unlikely to be subject to the 
proposed withholding tax.64  
3. Finality 
Every withholding tax presents the question of finality, being a 
practical, inaccurate gross tax mechanism in a system dominated by net 
taxation. It is always simpler to use a final withholding tax, yet this often 
means sacrificing accuracy or neutrality. Unilateral adoption of the 
withholding solution should probably employ a final tax. The mere 
choice of a withholding tax reflects preference for simplicity and 
certainty, and a final tax would serve this preference better. Moreover, 
the price such country is likely to pay in terms of accuracy and neutrality 
are not completely sacrificed, since the tax would be final only from the 
perspective of the payment state in the case that the residence state would 
provide a credit for the tax. The relative low rate of the tax should make 
such credit mechanism meaningful and meet the purpose of the tax: a 
fairer division of revenue between the source and the residence states. 
                                                                                                                     
 64.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(b)(2). 
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Fairness may require that the elevated rate for payments to non-
registered payees not be final, especially if a period of transition into the 
tax should be permitted. A country may provide an option to payees 
subject to this rate to file a tax return, claiming a refund of the excess rate 
paid to the country of source. The return should be filed with both 
jurisdictions consistently. Such mechanisms benefit both the source 
country that preserves its tax base and the residence country or the regime 
as a whole, because it secures its integrity, obtaining complete 
information about transactions, and fully taxing them. 
The choice of a withholding tax necessarily entails a significant 
burden on struggling enterprises. These may include start-up companies, 
companies in transition, loss-making companies, and low-margin 
companies. For these companies, the tax would mean a pure cost (and a 
cash strap) that further encumbers them and makes it difficult for them to 
succeed. These companies also differ from each other in their loss of 
support by the system. We may wish to support start-up companies, but 
not necessarily help lengthen the winding-down period for failed 
enterprises. It is difficult, however, to fairly distinguish between these 
types of companies, and past experience demonstrates that such attempts 
have not necessarily been successful.65 It is perhaps possible to add 
special rules for start-up companies that would work better, perhaps via 
special registration, but this Article prefers the  option each enterprise 
gets—to register and be taxed on a net basis, which sufficiently balances 
the impact of this tax. Lastly, if countries are seriously concerned about 
the impact of this tax, they may further balance it in other ways, such as 
ensuring carry-forward of foreign tax credits, special exemptions, or even 
refund schemes. 
4. Transition 
Transition rules are sensitive to the specific rules adopted, so it may 
be too early to attempt to prescribe them in this Article, yet one 
observation is appropriate for a more complete analysis of the proposal, 
and to demonstrate that transition is not a weakness of the proposal. The 
withholding solution introduces a new mechanism and a broad, default 
withholding obligation. This would require legislation and regulation in 
all participating countries, a process that may take time and is open to 
manipulation in the interim. Nevertheless, a major shift of real business 
is unlikely to happen in response to the tax, because the focus of 
compliance and enforcement is on the market and the destination, which 
could not easily be abused, rather than the more mobile residence or 
origin. 
                                                                                                                     
 65. The U.S. exceptions from the PFIC regime are an example. See I.R.C. § 1298(b). 
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5. Incentives 
Countries should consider the use of incentives to promote proper 
withholding. There is ample experience in the employment tax and VAT 
areas that could help here. One example demonstrates this thought: 
countries could agree on a very small administrative award to the 
withholding agents.66 This award could be facilitated similarly to a tax 
refund. The critical stage in the imposition of a withholding tax such as 
that proposed in this Article is its launch. In order to encourage 
compliance that would ensure its success, incentives should prove useful. 
These incentives may be tested over time and reviewed and amended as 
needed. 
6. Versatility 
The withholding solution is the optimal solution for the current state 
of affairs, as demonstrated throughout this Article. One cannot reliably 
predict the political responses to such reform. A major advantage of the 
withholding solution however is its versatility, its capability of 
functioning as a single, overall solution as suggested by this Article, or 
as a solution to the most acute challenge that the digital economy 
presents: the taxation of cross-border services,67 or even as an 
implementation mechanism for profit allocation to virtual PE if the nexus 
approach were adopted.68  
7. An “Alternative” Design: Withholding on Services 
An alternative design of the withholding solution could limit the 
withholding obligation to cross-border services without loosing the 
advantages of the original proposal.69 Reasons for this restriction may 
include: first, As regards sales of goods in general (both B2B and B2C) 
the problem of online retailers has nominally already been addressed 
under OECD BEPS Action 7,70 and Article 13 of MLI. Indeed, despite 
                                                                                                                     
 66. The monitoring system for VAT purposes in Sao Paulo, Brazil that also requires 
registration and electronic monitoring of invoices. Ordinance CAT No. 128/2013, published in 
the official Gazette of the State of São Paulo on 10/25/2013. 
 67. See Andrés Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, Reforming “Nexus”: Fitting the Existing 
International Tax Framework Around the Digital Economy Tax Policy Options Regarding Tax 
Challenges of the Digitalised Economy Under the Benjamin Franklin’s Rule for Decision Making 
[hereinafter Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus”], in TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: 
CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (Werner Haslehner ed., forthcoming 2019). 
 68. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper, 
supra note 26.  
 69. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67. 
 70. OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 
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the limited (quantitative) success of article 13 of the MLI and the doubt 
surrounding attribution rules to the newly created PEs,71 the significant 
reduction of PE exceptions in Art. 5(4) of the OECD Model will 
theoretically allow the Source State—that is, the state in which the 
‘logistic PE’ is located—to tax many ‘digital sales of goods’ that had been 
untaxed before its implementation.72 To the extent any new withholding 
also covers digital sales of goods, its interaction with the extended 
‘logistic PE’ should be resolved. One possible solution might be a rule 
similar to the PE provision in Articles 10(4), 11(4) and 12(3) of the 
OECD Model that would place income derived from digital sales of 
goods back in the category of PE taxation. However, to achieve that result 
it might be simpler to exclude all goods from the new withholding tax. 
Without a special rule addressing such potential conflict, the coexistence 
of ‘logistic PEs’ and a withholding tax covering sales of goods will 
inevitably raise characterization issues. Second, any future reform 
involving the expansion of source taxing rights on business income would 
require changes to current bilateral tax treaties. However, a withholding 
tax (just) on services would require fewer fundamental changes to tax 
treaties and even be in accordance with the current literal language of a 
significant number of existing ones.73 Third, limiting a withholding just 
to services might also avoid problems of compatibility with WTO Law, 
if any.74 
Beyond the technical advantages this option realizes that the 
digitalized economy is, by and large, an economy of services.75 Indeed 
                                                                                                                     
7 – 2015 Final 285 (2015). 
 71.  See Lisa Spinosa & Vikram Chand, A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized 
Business Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the 
Issue or Should the Focus Be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?, 46 INTERTAX 476, 481-90 
(2018). 
 72. Of course, the problem remains for suppliers without logistic centers in the market 
jurisdictions. See Georg Kofler, Gunter Mayr, & Christoph Schlager, Taxation of the Digital 
Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, 57 EUR. TAX’N 527 (2017) [hereinafter Kofler 
et al., Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?]; Georg Kofler, 
Gunter Mayr, & Christoph Schlager, Taxation of the Digital Economy: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Short-Term Measures, 58 EUR. TAX’N 123, 124 s. 2.2 (2018).  
 73. See infra Part I.D. 
 74. See infra Part I.E.  
 75. See also Jinyan Li, Protecting the Tax Base in a Digital Economy [hereinafter Li, 
Protecting the Tax Base in a Digital Economy], in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED 
ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 407, 424 (Alexander Trepelkov 
et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING 
THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES]; BEPS MONITORING GROUP, COMMENT, IN OECD, 
TAX CHALLENGES OF DIGITALISATION: COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE REQUEST FOR INPUT PART I, 
at 20, 27 (2017); David Orzechowski, The Taxation of Fees for Technical, Managerial and 
Consultancy Services in the Digital Economy with Respect to Art. 12A of the 2017 UN Model, 
in Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Fifteenth Session, 
E/C.18/2017/CRP.23 1, 29 (UN 2017). 
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the new business models of the digitalized economy have enlarged the 
very space of services (servitization) while expanding their overall 
quantitative importance. The advent of ‘cloud computing,’ which has 
actually turned software into service, is a classic example of servitization. 
Despite the doubts expressed by the 2015 OECD BEPS Action 1 Report 
on characterization,76 it is clear that cloud-computing arrangements 
should qualify for tax purposes as service contracts. As for expanding the 
quantitative importance of certain new business models, online 
advertising is just one case in point; the advantages of Internet advertising 
in comparison to traditional channels—by means of ‘user-generated 
content’ provided for ‘free’ by customers in two-sided platforms and 
subsequent tailored advertising—has provoked a dramatic increase in 
these services, with an expected growth rate of 12.1% per year over the 
period from 2014 to 2019.77 Similarly, digitalization has increased the 
importance of intermediation services, both between businesses and 
consumers78 and among consumers themselves.79 
D. Tax Treaty Implications 
If the withholding solution were to be implemented, amendments to 
the OECD Model and tax treaties would be required. With the view to 
minimize changes to the Model language, this article proposes the 
following amendments.  
1. A New Article 7(4) 
The new article should provide:  
Payments made by an enterprise of a Contracting State or borne by 
a permanent establishment situated in a Contracting State may be 
taxed in that State. The tax so charged shall not exceed: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 76. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 104-06. Some authors have correctly pointed out that both the 
2014 OECD BEPS Deliverable and the 2015 OECD BEPS Action 1 Report overstate the alleged 
lack of guidance regarding cloud computing, probably reflecting an invigorated revenue interest 
of the source state (Matthias Valta, Article 12 (Income from Royalties), in KLAUS VOGEL ON 
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 1000 (m.note 107) (Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust, eds., 
4th ed. 2015). 
 77. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 113-14. Additionally, figures show that online advertising may 
only be in its infancy. See, e.g., Assaf Prussak, The Income of the 21st Century: Online Advertising 
as a Case Study for the Implications of Technology for Source-Based Taxation, 16 TUL. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 39, 53 (2013). 
 78. A good example would be digital travel agencies, such as Booking.com. 
 79. This is the model of platforms within the collaborative economy such as Airbnb & Uber. 
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(a) (10) per cent of the gross amount of the payments if the payee 
is an enterprise of the other Contracting State or a permanent 
establishment situated therein duly registered with the first-
mentioned Contracting State for the purposes of this paragraph; 
and 
 
(b) (15) per cent of the gross amount of the payments in all other 
cases. 
 
A contracting state may not tax a payment borne by a permanent 
establishment of an enterprise of the same contracting state 
situated elsewhere. 
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by 
mutual agreement settle the mode of application of this tax, 
including specified exemptions for non-base-eroding and other 
similar payments. 
2. The Commentary 
This Article further proposes additions to the commentary for the sake 
of standardization of the exemptions to the withholding solution. 
3. Other Adjustments 
The old article 7(4) should become article 7(5). Article 7(1) Should 
be amended to begin with the phrase: “Subject to the provision of 
paragraph 4. Finally, although seemingly more than a minor adjustment, 
the article recommends that article 12 be considered for elimination. 
Article 12 primarily taxes income that is, in essence, business income, 
and therefore should be folded into article 7. The new withholding tax 
will capture payments not subject to article 7(1) and would not hurt any 
source taxation.   There is no need to amend articles 10, 11, and 15. 
All the above depends on a standard registration and qualifications 
scheme that could be developed in the Commentary or externally to the 
Model. In any event, it should not affect the text of the Model itself for 
the sake of effectiveness and flexibility. If countries chose to more strictly 
standardize a withholding tax solution, specific amendments may be 
made to articles 26 and 27 of the OECD Model to adapt the mutual 
assistance and information exchange mechanisms to the withholding 
solution. Of course, the registration scheme should improve the efficacy 
of treaty information exchange. 
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4. An “Alternative” Treaty Provision for a Withholding Tax on Services 
If the limited option of restricting the withholding solution to services 
is elected, current article 12A of the UN Model Tax Convention could be 
followed. In 2017, the UN Model was revised to include a new provision 
attributing taxing rights to Source States with respect to fees for technical 
services in the absence of a PE. UN Art. 12A followed a growing trend 
in tax treaties concluded between developing countries and, to a lesser 
extent, between developing and developed countries, to include separate 
provisions allowing source taxation of ‘fees for technical services.’80 
Apart from minor technical details, this new distributive rule would 
preserve the taxing rights of source states that choose to limit the 
withholding solution to services of the type described in this Article.81 
E. Potential Discrimination Issues: WTO, EU & Treaty Law 
A withholding tax proposal such as the withholding solution implies 
different treatment of domestic and cross-border transactions that in some 
circumstances may entail a breach of non-discrimination obligations 
under WTO, EU, and tax treaty Law. Withholding on cross-border 
transactions on the basis of gross payments as opposed to taxation on a 
net basis (the norm in domestic income taxation) has been routinely 
accused of infringing EU law, particularly with respect to EU 
fundamental freedoms.82 Similar argument were made83 based on 
potential violations of international economic laws (i.e., the General 
Agreement on Tariffs (GATT),84 and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).85 Furthermore, since the withholding solution is based 
                                                                                                                     
 80.  See Wim Wijnen, Jan de Goede, & Andrea Alessi, The Treatment of Services in Tax 
Treaties, 66 BULL. INT’L TAX’N, 27, 27-33 (2012) (documenting survey conducted); Angharad 
Miller, TAXING CROSS-BORDER SERVICES: CURRENT WORLDWIDE PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR 
CHANGE, 147 (2016).  
 81. Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67 (analyzing those details). 
 82. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 
2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115; Kofler et al., Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick 
Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, supra note 72, at 529; Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How 
to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 22, at 286. 
 83. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 
2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115; Kofler et al., Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick 
Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, supra note 72, at 529; Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How 
to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 22, at 286. 
 84. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994). 
 85. General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994). 
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on a self-enforcing mechanism according to which the deduction of 
payments to non-residents for covered transactions is made conditional 
on the effective withholding, it may constitute a violation of Article 24(4) 
of bilateral tax treaties fashioned after the 2017 OECD or UN Models if, 
in fact, the deduction of similar payments to residents are not subject to a 
similar condition. 
The first option for resolving these problems would be to simply 
extend the withholding obligation to similar domestic transactions.86 
Some commentators have claimed that extending the scope of ‘digital 
taxes,’ be they withholding taxes or equalization levies, to cover purely 
domestic transactions would have a dramatic, anti-technology impact,87 
However, as regards withholding taxes88 such effect is not expected as a 
result of the extension of a withholding obligation to domestic 
transactions. Indeed, in a treaty context (when the treaty provides for 
source taxation of the corresponding transactions)89 the tax withheld at 
source would be credited in the Residence State.90 In a non-treaty context, 
depending on domestic regulation, the tax withheld at source would be 
creditable, in principle, in the Residence State according to a 
corresponding unilateral foreign tax credit. A purely domestic scenario 
should be handled in the same manner. If the withholding is extended to 
also cover domestic situations, the tax withheld will be creditable against 
domestic (mainstream) corporate income tax. In any case, the material 
outcome of this extension would be irrelevant if one considers that 
companies performing domestic transactions would normally have to 
make advance tax payments, which may be equivalent to an eventual new 
withholding tax on domestic transactions.91 
Should the extension of the withholding solution to domestic 
transactions not be accepted, different potential discriminations should be 
considered. First, WTO law obligations. Both GATT and GATS require 
their signatories to tax foreign suppliers of goods and services no less 
favorably than its own domestic suppliers. GATS, However, provides 
broad exceptions when the signatory applies direct tax measures.92 More 
specifically, GATS Art. XIV(d) provides that nothing in the Agreement 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67. 
 87. Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 
22, at 285. 
 88. See, e.g., Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67 (regarding 
Equalization Levies and how things might be different). 
 89.   See supra Part I.D. 
 90. Model Art. 23. 
 91. Of course, financial differences might exist in those cases in which standard advance 
payments are calculated on the basis of net profits, taking into account that our withholding 
proposal calculates tax liability on gross payments. 
 92. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 
2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115. 
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is to be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member 
of measures inconsistent with Article XVII (i.e., the national treatment 
rule) provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the 
equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of 
services or service suppliers of other Members. Article XIV(d)’s footnote 
6 expands on that concept to cover measures that include, in particular, 
the application of withholding taxes to non-residents.93 Therefore, a gross 
withholding tax on services94 would not violate the GATS.95 A broader 
withholding tax covering also sales of goods might face more difficulties 
in this respect, yet income tax rules rarely meet the preliminary 
requirements for the application of the GATT national treatment (non-
discrimination) rules, requirement such as application to imports in the 
relevant case, and the discriminatory treatment of “like” goods.”96 The 
withholding solution will rarely apply to payments for imported goods in 
the first place, so there is little reason to believe that a broad withholding 
tax would be considered discriminatory under GATT even prior to the 
application of the remedial justifications available in the GATT.97  
Second, EU-Law. In light of recent decisions coming out of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on withholding taxes, 
particularly its Brisal decision,98 certain withholding tax critics have 
become more specific and more strident in their criticisms.99 Indeed, 
Brisal and other contemporary decisions100 have made it clear that the 
CJEU’s Truck Center judgment101 could not be understood as an excuse 
to apply different tax collection systems to residents and non-residents.102 
                                                                                                                     
 93.  JENNIFER E. FARRELL, THE INTERFACE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND TAXATION 
192 (2013). 
 94. See supra Part I.C.7. 
 95. In the same vein, with certain nuances on services rendered outside the source state, see 
Brian J. Arnold, The Taxation of Income from Services [Arnold, The Taxation of Income from 
Services], in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 75, at 117-18. 
 96.  Georg Kofler & Yariv Brauner, Interaction of tax treaties with international economic 
law, ch. OM3, in GLOBAL TAX TREATY COMMENTARY, IBFD Online (Richard Vann ed., 2016, 
updated 2018). 
 97.  Advanced payments on imports of goods were the closest measures to withholding 
taxes that were examined under the GATT, and that only in a few country trade policy reviews 
cases under the GATT when imposed on importations of goods, a hardly analogous situation to 
that of the withholding solution. See, e.g., FARRELL, THE INTERFACE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND TAXATION, supra note 93, at 56-57. 
 98.  Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland, Case C-18/15. 
 99.  Italian Banking Association (ABI), in OECD, Public Comments Received on the Tax 
Challenges of Digitalization, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-comments-received-on-the-
tax-challenges-of-digitalization.htm (accessed Aug. 22, 2018), at 5. 
 100.  Such as Hirvonen, C-632/13, Judgment, EU:C:2015:765; Miljoen, Joined Cases C-
10/14, C-14/14 & C-17/14, Judgment, EU:C:2015:608. 
 101.  Truck Center, C-282/07, Judgment EU:C:2008:762. 
 102.  CFE ECJ Task Force, Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2016 on the Decision of the Court 
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In fact, with respect to the main issue at stake (i.e., creating different rules 
for taxable bases for domestic and cross-border transactions)103 it is clear 
from the CJEU’s Brisal and other decisions104 that in principle it is an 
infringement of the freedom to provide services if non-resident taxpayers, 
in contrast to resident taxpayers, cannot deduct expenses directly 
connected to the activity that is being taxed, which difference could well 
be found to be an insurmountable obstacle to the application of a 
withholding tax.105 Yet, that hasty conclusion would not reflect reality, as 
a significant number of EU Member States already allow deductions for 
expenses directly related to the respective income obtained by (certain) 
service providers resident anywhere within EU/EEA countries.106 In fact, 
some of these EU/EEA service provider regimes are the result of the 
attempt by various Member States’ to implement the CJEU’s criteria for 
an EU law compatible withholding tax.  
Third, tax treaties law of non-discrimination. If the withholding 
obligation is not extended to purely domestic transactions it would seem 
to violate Art. 24(4)107 of tax treaties fashioned after the OECD or UN 
Models. However, prominent authors have expressed dissenting views 
                                                                                                                     
of Justice of the European Union of 13 July 2016, in Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland (Case C-
18/15), on the Admissibility of Gross WHT of Interest, 57 EUR. TAX’N 30, 32–33 (2017). 
 103.  As regards the existence of different techniques for charging tax on residents and non-
residents, AG Kokott states correctly that the Court held on a number of occasions that the specific 
technique of deducting tax at source for non-resident service providers in principle does not 
infringe freedom to provide services (Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland, C-18/15, AG Opinion, 
EU:C:2016:182, para. 22). 
 104.  See an exhaustive list of this case law in Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered 
on 17 March 2016 in Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland, C-18/15, AG Opinion, EU:C:2016:182, para. 
27. 
 105.  Particularly if these conclusions can be expanded to other sources of income such as 
royalties or service fees. In the affirmative as regards royalties: Eric Kemmeren, Gross WHT: Is 
the Court of Justice of the European Union Back on Track with Regard to Deductible Expenses, 
2017-1 EC TAX REV. 2, 7. 
 106.  In particular Andreas Hable & Christian Wimpissinger, Austria, in 97A Enterprise 
Services 116 (IFA Cahiers 2012); Claudine Devillet & Xavier Van Vlem, Belgium, in 97A 
Enterprise Services 144 (IFA Cahiers 2012) (referred to entertainers for which a limited lump-
sum cost deduction is allowed); Lenka Fialkova, Czech Republic, in 97A Enterprise Services 260 
(IFA Cahiers 2012); Anders Norgaard & Philip Noes, Denmark, in 97A Enterprise Services 277 
(IFA Cahiers 2012) (for entertainers); Borbála Kolozs & Annamária Köszegi, Hungary, in 97A 
Enterprise Services 344 (IFA Cahiers 2012) (for individual service providers); René Monfrooig 
& Linda Ten Broeke, The Netherlands, in 97A Enterprise Services 501–502 (IFA 2012); Rita 
Calcada Pires, Portugal, in 97A Enterprise Services 571–572 (IFA Cahiers 2012); José Manuel 
Calderón Carrero, Spain, in 97A Enterprise Services 629 (IFA 2012) (only for services carried 
out physically in Spain). 
 107.  Even if articles 24(4) of both the OECD and the UN Models differ in detail, both 
provisions essentially prohibit the implementation of deduction barriers for cross-border interests, 
royalties, and fees for technical services more burdensome than those imposed for similar 
domestic transactions.  
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claiming that Art. 24 would not prevent a country from denying a 
deduction of amounts paid by a resident to a non-resident where the 
resident does not withhold tax properly in accordance with the law.108 
This view seems to be exclusively based upon the Commentaries of both 
the OECD and the UN Model Tax Conventions when stating that 
measures that are mandated or expressly authorized by provisions of the 
treaty different from Art. 24 cannot be considered to violate the 
provisions of the latter even if they only apply, for example, as regards 
payments to non-residents.109 The difficulty in the case of the withholding 
obligation is that tax treaties do not specifically obligate countries to tax 
but rather limit their taxing rights leaving the actual taxing rules to 
domestic law. Nonetheless, in the post-BEPS era when emphasis is given 
to anti-abuse aspects of tax treaties and the multilateral aspects of the 
international tax regime are increasingly recognized, with the multilateral 
instrument symbolizing the peak of such trend, it is not inconceivable to 
view the withholding solution from a similar angle, not different than 
BEPS action 2 that provides for a denial of deduction and taxation of 
income not regularly taxed under domestic law in appropriate 
circumstances.   
II. WHY NEW LAW FOR TAXING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY? 
A reform proposal must first justify its necessity and superiority to 
current law. Taxing the digitalized economy is not really a new 
problem.110 Yet, until recently reform proposals have not been able to 
overcome this first hurdle, where countries repeatedly choose to tweak 
the existing rules and rely on increasingly weaker analogies rather than 
directly face the inevitability of fundamental reform. Recent measures 
adopted by several countries in response to the challenges presented by 
the digital economy suggest that the wall protecting the traditional rules 
is beginning to crack,111 demonstrating the implementing countries’ 
belief that traditional norms could not ensure adequate taxation of MNE, 
consistently with the concern manifested in the choice of the BEPS 
project to make the challenge to tax the digital economy its first action 
                                                                                                                     
 108.  Arnold, The Taxation of Income from Services, supra note 95, at 120. 
 109.  Para. 4 of the Commentaries to article 24 of the 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention 
and Para. 4 of the Commentaries to article 24 of the UN Model Tax Convention 2017. 
 110.  See, e.g., RICHARD DOERNBERG & LUC HINNEKENS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1999) [hereinafter DOERNBERG & HINNEKENS, ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION]; RICHARD DOERNBERG, LUC HINNEKENS, WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN, & JINYAN LI, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL TAXATION 
(2001); JINYAN LI, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2003). 
 111.  See infra Part III.A.  
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item.112 These developments demonstrate that the majority of the world’s 
countries are of the view that the current international tax regime cannot 
adequately apply to the digital economy, and that past tactics of tweaking 
and creative interpretations of the current laws are not adequate 
substitutes for reform. Nonetheless the conservative view is often 
supported by the perception of powerful countries that they might benefit 
in the short term from the blocking of reform. This is primarily because 
a fundamental principle of the necessary reform would be to more fairly 
distribute tax bases among countries, which seems to deprive them of 
potential revenue. Yet, such a view is Pollyannish at best. This Part 
demonstrates the inadequacy of current norms, followed by an 
explanation why fundamental, technical reform is necessary, and why 
tweaking current law is not a viable option, because it will lead to the 
undesirable consequences of blocking reform. The rest of the Article 
expands on this analysis more concretely with analysis of the various 
options for reform.  
A. Current Law is (Really) Insufficient and Unsustainable 
The inadequacy of the current regime in taxing the digital economy 
was a primary trigger of the BEPS project. This Part begins with a review 
of the project’s observations and conclusions about the necessity of 
reform, followed by additional support for this conclusion.  
BEPS Action item 1 required a report discussing the challenges posed 
by the digital economy to the current international tax rules,113 based on 
an understanding, long realized by scholars, that such rules were never 
designed for it.114 The regime failed to adapt to technological progress 
and to the ascent of intangibles, as it merely tweaked the rules,115 
apparently in an unsatisfactorily manner to fit these developments.116 The 
BEPS context was obvious because MNEs, whose use of tax planning 
schemes triggered the launch of the BEPS project, all have heavily relied 
on intangibles in exploiting the tax advantages of an imperfectly 
                                                                                                                     
 112.  OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 23. 
 113.  Id. at 14-15. 
 114.  See, e.g., Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue Between 
Developed and Developing Countries, supra note 10, at 19, 21. 
 115.  See, e.g., OECD, E-COMMERCE: TRANSFER PRICING AND BUSINESS PROFITS TAXATION 
113 (2005), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/e-commerce-transfer-pricing-and-business-
profits-taxation_9789264007222-en. The most significant outcome of this work was the changes 
to Article 5 in the OECD Commentary on the Model Tax Convention, resulting in the addition of 
paragraphs 42.1-42.10. to the Model Commentary on Article 5. 
 116.  This is evidenced by the OECD identifying the “[a]pplication of treaty concepts to 
profits derived from the delivery of digital goods and services” as a key pressure area that must 
be addressed by the BEPS project, later reflected in action item 1. See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE 
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 16, at 47. 
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regulated digital economy.117  
The goal of action 1 was modest: the generation of a report, but the 
OECD quickly understood that more than that was required. 
Consequently, the OECD focused on a few reasonable solutions for the 
most important issues at stake. The final action 1 report acknowledges 
the need for post-BEPS monitoring and seems to state that the digital 
economy taskforce will continue to exist for implementation and 
monitoring purposes.118 It is unclear first whether meaningful action will 
be taken on any of the issues discussed. But eventually, the Task Force 
on the Digital Economy (TFDE), initially a subsidiary of the OECD tax 
committee on fiscal affairs, transformed into a subsidiary of the post-
BEPS inclusive framework, and in 2017 proceeded to work on the 
matter.119 Action was taken regarding consumption taxes.120 The road 
taken by the OECD and the BEPS project regarding the taxation of the 
digital economy has been winding, exposing both the complexity of the 
matter and the deep disagreement and conflict of interests among 
countries over the optimal solution. One feature of the work has not 
changed: the understanding that some form of substantive reform is 
necessary because the current rules are inadequate.121 
The inadequacy of the current rules and the urgency of reform were 
further exposed by unilateral actions taken by a number of countries, all 
of which were concurrently participants in the efforts to reach consensus 
                                                                                                                     
 117.  See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in 
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, at A1; Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in No-Tax 
Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2012-12-10/google-revenues-sheltered-in-no-tax-bermuda-soar-to-10-billion 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019); Richard Waters, Microsoft’s Foreign Tax Planning Under Scrutiny, 
FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2011, 2:38 AM). 
 118.  Yet, no final recommendations have been furnished and no practical action had initially 
been taken to actually establish a follow-up forum in the same manner already done regarding 
other items, such as the consumption tax aspects of action items 1, 14, and 15. See OECD, 
ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 23, at 13; OECD, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, 
ACTION 14 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, at 37-41; OECD, DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO 
MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, ACTION 15 - 2015 FINAL REPORT.  
 119.  Generating a so-called interim report: OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM 
DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, promising a final report in 2020, followed 
by another apparently interim report: OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: ADDRESSING 
THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (Feb. 12, 2019) [hereinafter 
OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT], each document’s significantly divergent from its 
predecessor. 
 120.  The discussion of consumption taxes is beyond the scope of this article. For more on 
that, see, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the OECD’s International VAT/GST 
Guidelines, 18 FLA. TAX. REV. 589 (2016). 
 121.  See, e.g., OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 
2018, supra note 23, at 18-20. 
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on the matter.122   
Finally, various outfits, including policy think tanks,123 international 
institutions,124 European institutions,125 groups of academic 
economists,126 NGOs,127 and the French government pioneering the 
quantitative study of the issue,128 all recorded information and analyses 
on the ineffective taxation of the digital economy under the current norms 
of the international tax regime. 
B. Fundamental and Technical Reform 
The overwhelming data about the inability of countries to adequately 
tax the digital economy was predated by burgeoning scholarship both 
predicting such futility and explaining the legal problems causing it.129 
The BEPS project echoed much of the same analysis,130 yet increasingly 
                                                                                                                     
 122.  For a more detailed review and analysis of some of these actions, see infra Part III.A. 
This was acknowledged and partly reviewed also by the interim report, OECD, TAX CHALLENGES 
ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, ch. 4. 
 123.  See, e.g., BEPS Monitoring Group, TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Oct. 
2017), available at https://bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/digital-
economy.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
 124.  See, e.g., Alex Cobham & Petr Janský, Global distribution of revenue loss from tax 
avoidance: Re-estimation and country results (WIDER Working Paper 2017/55, 2017), available 
at https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2017-55.pdf (last viewed Feb. 15, 2019). 
 125.  See, e.g., European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, COM (2018) 146, 4 (“companies with digital business 
models pay less than half the tax rate of businesses with traditional business models”). 
 126.  See, e.g., FRANCE STRATEGIE, TAXATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: A SURVEY OF 
THEORETICAL MODELS - FINAL REPORT (FEB. 26, 2015), available at https://www.strategie.gouv. 
fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/ficalite_du_numerique_10_mars_corrige_final.pdf (last 
viewed Feb. 15, 2019).  
 127.  See, e.g., Why Sabmiller Should Stop Dodging Taxes in Africa, ACTIONAID.ORG, 
https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/calling_time_on_tax_avoidance.pdf. 
(last viewed Feb. 15, 2019); Petr Jansky & Alex Prats, Multinational Corporations and the Profit-
Shifting Lure of Tax Havens (Christian Aid Occasional Paper No. 9, 2013), https://www.christian 
aid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/multinational-corporations-profit-sha ring-lure-tax-havens-
march-2013.pdf (last viewed Feb. 15, 2019).  
 128.  Pierre Collin & Nicolas Colin: Report from the Task Force on Taxation of the Digital 
Economy, 2013. English translation, available at https://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/ 
06/Taxation_Digital_Economy.pdf (last viewed Feb. 15, 2019). 
 129.  See, e.g., Kingson, Taxing the Future, supra note 5; DOERNBERG & HINNEKENS, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 110; Diane M. Ring, 
Exploring the Challenges of Electronic Commerce Taxation through the Experience of Financial 
Instruments, 51 TAX L. REV. 663 (1996); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997); Arthur J. Cockfield, The Law and Economics 
of Digital Taxation: Challenges to Traditional Tax Laws and Principles, 56 BULL. INT'L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 606 (2002); LI, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 110; Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation 
of Tax Revenue Between Developed and Developing Countries, supra note 10.  
 130.  See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 
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with a muted voice that is attributed to the politics of the issue rather than 
from the countries’ coping with the challenges of taxing the digital 
economy using current rules. The inevitability of declaring some success 
of the BEPS measures, and more importantly, the consensus-based nature 
of the OECD that simply cannot innovate when its members genuinely 
disagree on the optimal solution to the challenges, are challenges that all 
governments face.131 
It would be useful therefore to review the precise flaws of the current 
rules pertaining to their inability, not weakness, to effectively tax the 
digital economy, providing theoretical support to the empirical case 
mandating reform. Note again, that this Article, in line with the BEPS 
agenda, assumes that reform of the international tax regime must be 
gradual, based on preservation of corporate income taxation and the 
majority of the current principles of the regime. This means that a 
discussion about replacing the current regime with a consumption-based 
scheme is beyond the scope of this Article.132 
The first and most obvious challenge is the dominance of physical 
presence in the rule for taxing business income. There is consensus that 
countries should not tax foreign firms (typically identified by residence) 
unless such firms (or individuals)133 sufficiently participate in the 
domestic economy, with sufficiency measures in terms of physical 
presence in a country. The almost universal rule tracks the tax treaties 
norm embedded in Article 5 of the OECD Model, using the PE 
terminology. This is a threshold rule that, first, mandates physical 
presence for domestic taxation of business income of a foreign 
corporation, and, second, clarifies that minimal, trivial presence cannot 
justify such taxation—only sufficiently significant (permanent) presence 
will.  
The implicit assumption for this norm has been that every significant 
business presence would require significant physical presence in the 
country where it earns income, which makes it fair for the local 
jurisdiction to tax the related income to such presence. The power of this 
rule is in the intuition that domestic presence justifies domestic taxation, 
                                                                                                                     
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 78-82. 
 131.  See, e.g., OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 
2018, supra note 23, at 90, 108. Compare, e.g., id. ¶ 245 (“This early evidence of the impact and 
implementation of some key BEPS measures holds much promise for the resolution of double 
non-taxation concerns exacerbated by digitalization”) with, e.g., id. ¶ 312 (“[T]here is a growing 
perception that the BEPS measures will not address the tax challenges that have a broader impact 
and relate primarily to the allocation of taxing rights among different jurisdictions”).  
 132.  Although there are many good reasons for considering such more fundamental reform. 
See, e.g., David F. Bradford, Commentary: Electronic Commerce and Fundamental Tax Reform, 
52 TAX L. REV. 561 (1997). 
 133.  The rules for individuals are basically the same. This Article focuses on the firm 
narrative for clarity. 
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because such intuition forges the legitimacy of the norm that eventually 
became universal. The assumption at the basis of this norm does not apply 
to firms operating in the digital economy, since they do not have to have 
physical presence where they generate profits.  
Consequently, the basic norm for taxing business income cannot be 
used to tax these firms. Preserving the basic norm requires a digital 
analogy to the physical presence test, which is exactly the goal of the 
nexus-based solutions analyzed below,134 yet such analogy inherently 
lacks the intuitive legitimacy that the physical presence rule enjoys. It 
requires a new formulation of the nexus rule to fit the digital economy, a 
formulation that is beyond mere tweaking of the current rule, requiring 
first the establishment of basic understanding of the rationale for the 
consequential division of tax bases between countries, and, second, 
agreement on the details of the rule, agreement that could garner 
acceptance by a divergent group of countries with differing interests 
(some of which necessarily will find themselves losing revenue as a result 
of the new arrangement), in short a tall order that clearly amounts to a 
fundamental reform. 
A second pillar of the international tax regime is its reliance on the 
source/residence paradigm, translated into the general tax bases division 
norm of taxing residents on their worldwide income and non-resident 
only on their domestic source income. This paradigm depends on a 
universal understanding of the residence and source concepts. The 
residence rules for individuals were effectively harmonized, yet the 
residence rules for corporations proved unworkable, even when countries 
agreed on a mutual articulation of a corporate residence test (such as the 
common “place of effective management”).  
They failed to reach sufficiently similar interpretation of such test, 
leading the BEPS project to recommend elimination of a tie-breaking test 
for corporate residence, and therefore, leaving the matter to treaty 
partners to resolve among themselves through mutual agreement.135 The 
source of the problem was the analogy between humans and corporations, 
as if the corporate person, like the human person, conducts business 
primarily where it is located, and location is determined based on easily 
observed, primarily physical attributes, attributes that are easily 
manipulable in the case of corporations and, more importantly, 
meaningless, since corporate business may easily be conducted in 
locations unrelated to the technical legal residence of the fiction we call 
corporation. Corporations participating in the digital economy face fewer 
constraints in establishing their residence for tax purposes, because they 
rely much less on physical factors, such as people and equipment, and 
                                                                                                                     
 134.  See infra Part III.B. 
 135.  See OECD Model Art. 4(3). 
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more on computers that could be located essentially anywhere, to perform 
their core business functions. 
The source rules present a similarly problematic picture despite the 
essential universality of the rules themselves. The majority of source 
rules have little basis in economics or any other explanatory paradigm, 
since their role is to facilitate the division of tax bases among jurisdictions 
where such division is itself arbitrary in the sense that it is not based on 
any normative theory but rather on a political necessity. They solely 
require acceptance or legitimacy to perform their functions. The current 
source rules achieved the necessary legitimacy, at least for purposes other 
than the taxation of the digital economy. Most source rules depend on 
residence, physical location of assets, people or identifiable transactions 
such as sales. These bases for the traditional source rules failed to pass 
muster in the context of the digital economy: residence, as explained 
above, is particularly manipulable and difficult to determine in this 
context, physical presence is meaningless, and assets and transactions 
“take place” nowhere. Source taxation of the digital economy has been 
proven impossible pursuant to the current international tax regime.      
A third pillar of the international tax regime is the profit allocation 
regime for related party (non-market) transactions. These include the 
rules for allocation of profits to PE (i.e., between the corporation and its 
branch) and the transfer pricing rules for allocation of profits among 
related parties (each of which is a separate entity) engaged in non-market 
transactions. Here too an essentially universal norm arose, demanding 
non-market transactions to be priced by analogy to “comparable” market 
transactions, following the arm’s length standard (ALS). The idea behind 
this standard is to prevent manipulation, resulting in inappropriate tax 
minimization by multinational firms who completely control the pricing 
of intra-firm transactions that absent the transfer pricing rules would 
result in shifting of profits from high to low tax jurisdiction, robbing the 
former of due revenue. The application of the ALS is difficult at the best 
of times, yet the digital economy presents unique challenges: 
  
(1) the firms participating in the digital economy transact in 
intangibles significantly more than other MNE, and often generate most 
of their income from such transactions, and the current transfer pricing 
rules are not equipped to deal with sophisticated transactions in 
intangibles;136  
(2) the ALS depends on residence determinations that are especially 
difficult and manipulable for digital economy corporations,137 permitting 
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additional degrees of freedom in their transfer pricing analysis;138  
(3) ALS analysis depends heavily on assessments of risk, which is 
difficult to quantify and truly impossible to evaluate in an exercise of tax 
base division among two jurisdictions when the subject of division is 
profits of a digital economy firm, because such firm could essentially at 
will shift manifestations of risk to any jurisdiction it wishes,139 a problem 
identified yet not satisfactorily resolved by the BEPS project;140  
(4) the ALS is poorly designed to deal with highly integrated firms of 
the kind that dominates the digital economy. 
 
In conclusion, neither the factual reality nor the theoretical basis 
behind the current international tax regime could support the claim that 
such regime is capable of adequately taxing the digital economy without 
significant reform.  
C. The Consequences of Blocking Reform 
To complete the argument in favor of the necessity of reform, this 
Article argues that blocking such reform is risky and undesirable. The 
biggest risk of waiting is to the very international tax regime that such a 
conservative approach pretends to preserve. Multiple countries, all of 
which participated in the BEPS project and the work on BEPS action 1, 
have already enacted unilateral measures to tax the digital economy.141 
These measures vary, as is expected from decentralized actions that 
respond to particular needs, interests, and internal politics of each country 
separately. Once unilateral measures begin to dominate the regime, 
standardization and the coherence of the international tax regime suffer, 
threatening its stability, especially when the countries jumping the gun 
are all powerful nations, naturally hurting the trust of the less powerful 
nations in the post-BEPS cooperation effort (through the inclusive 
framework), which is precisely the reverse of the desired effect.     
III. VIABLE REFORM ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS  
Seven years after the launch of the BEPS project, the OECD, now in 
the format of the inclusive framework, is still working on possible 
solutions to meet the challenges presented by the digital economy with a 
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view of building a consensus among stakeholders around a standard 
solution. The work has been slow, and the road bumpy, causing the work 
to shift focuses over the years, yet, at the present several proposals have 
been presented and evaluated by international organizations, individual 
countries, taxpayers (and business organizations), scholars and other tax 
experts. This Article contributes to this discourse with elaboration on the 
withholding solution and demonstration of its advantages over other 
proposals, a task taken by this Part. The Part begins however with a 
review of actual countries’ responses, all taking action while participating 
in the BEPS effort to reach a universal consensus, controversially 
“jumping the gun,” with a view to influencing the final consensus, out of 
frustration with the pace or direction of the BEPS work, or simply 
because “they could,” taking advantage of political opportunities to 
advance their interests, at least until a global solution is adopted, if at all.  
A. Actual Countries’ Responses to BEPS Action 1 
A review of countries’ responses to the challenges of taxing the digital 
economy while the BEPS project is working on a globally standard 
solution is important to give context to the comparison of proposals that 
this Part makes. First, actual measures adopted and implemented by 
countries serve as natural experiments of sorts, contributing to the 
assessment of both technical and political feasibility of the various 
solutions. Second, although it is too early to assess the impact and 
effectiveness of these measures, one could learn from responses to and 
assessments of the measures on possible merits and disadvantages of the 
various proposals. Third, these measures expose the political aspects of 
the digital economy tax discourse, the fragility of the current international 
tax regime (inability to stop stakeholders from jumping the gun, the 
ineffectiveness of current rules), and the relative power positions in the 
regime, allowing some countries to go rogue and at the same time to lead 
the consensus building effort without concern about the impact of such 
actions on their standing in the future international tax regime, while 
other countries (most notably—India), realizing their newly acquired 
power to influence the process and make sure their interests, ignored until 
present times, are considered in the development of a consensus based 
solution, if any.    
Perhaps most famously the United Kingdom142 and Australia143 
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adopted diverted profit taxes (DPT), colloquially known as Google taxes. 
The U.K. DPT was the first notable unilateral measure in the context of 
BEPS action 1. It imposes a 25% tax (higher than the normal U.K. 
corporate tax rate) on diverted profits, which encompass profits of foreign 
companies generated by provision of goods and services in the United 
Kingdom without a PE, and profits generated by certain intercompany 
transactions lacking economic substance and not fully taxed in the United 
Kingdom.144  The Australian DPT, at a rate of 40% is applicable as of 
July 1, 2017, and was preceded by a related change to the Australian 
GAAR, in effect as of January 2016, named multinational anti-avoidance 
law (MAAL), giving power to the tax authorities to apply a penalty up to 
120% of the additional tax imposed on large entities (generally 
consolidated groups with turnover exceeding AUD 1b) meeting certain 
tax avoidance tests. Both measures include multiple tests and exceptions 
and seem to be designed to compel MNE to effectively become taxpayers 
(and information providers). Both taxes may be exposed to legal145 and 
political challenges.146 Although not directly targeting the challenging 
features of the digital economy the DPT was clearly designed to combat 
particular structures used by U.S. MNE that dominated the digital 
economy, most specifically the Google “Double Irish/Dutch Sandwich” 
structure.147 This solution is therefore very crude and rife with legal 
problems that it could not be, and has not been presented as a potential 
global solution; it is the prototypical unilateral solution that disregards 
impact on other countries, and a measure that could only be imposed, if 
at all, by the most powerful economies that believe they could unilaterally 
compel MNE to subject themselves to their scrutiny.     
Several other countries adopted versions of the nexus solution, or 
virtual PE. Israel effectively adopted this solution through a circular 
interpreting domestic law in a manner that permits taxation of significant 
economic presence similarly to PE.148 The circular establishes criteria for 
identification of significant economic presence, including: operation 
primarily through the Internet and performance of activities such as: 
                                                                                                                     
visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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identifying customers, collecting or analyzing Israeli market information, 
providing customer services in Israel, and developing or maintaining a 
Hebrew-language website.149 Finally, the circular clarifies that the 
agency PE analysis should apply also for virtual PE, giving an example 
of a related-party agent in Israel that makes all of the key decisions 
regarding the conclusion of contracts (formal approval of the foreign 
taxpayer does not reverse the PE status). Enterprises resident in non-
treaty countries should fare worse under these rules triggering PE 
treatment with even minimal volume of the above-mentioned activities. 
The circular has already been implemented with assessments issued to 
the largest MNE operating in Israel without physical presence, despite 
the obvious conflict between the Israeli position and that of the BEPS 
project, on which the Israeli Tax Authorities supposedly rely in its 
interpretation.150 India is expected to adopt a similar approach in new 
rules expected to be in effect on April 1, 2019, after the failure to do so 
through interpretation of the current PE rules in a manner similar to 
Israel’s.151 The Slovak Republic adopted in 2017 a more limited 
expansion of “fixed place of business,” to include online platforms 
(AirBNB, UBER).152 Hungary adopted a tax on net income from 
advertising services, based on the destination of the advertisement and 
the location of the targeted public (i.e., without need for physical presence 
in Hungary).153 Several other countries seriously considered adopting 
similar rules or interpretations, yet have not done so.154 Finally, the 
European Commission proposed on March 21, 2018 a directive for a long 
term solution for taxing the digital economy based on the nexus approach 
and the significant economic presence idea.155 Yet, in parallel, the 
Commission proposed a so-called interim solution in the form of a 
“digital services tax,” which attracted most of the interest as explained 
below, leaving the nexus proposal undeveloped, at least in the present.156 
Italy adopted in 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2019, a withholding scheme that 
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seem to be a hybrid between a withholding solution and an equalization 
levy.157  
India chose to adopt a different version of source-oriented solution 
with its version of the equalization levy, which it was the first to 
implement.158 The 6% levy imposed in June 2016,159 following court 
losses of the government of India attempting to tax MNE in India based 
on analogy to traditional PE rules.160 It is imposed on the gross amount 
paid by business taxpayers in India to non-residents (unless they have a 
PE in India) for online advertisement and related services above a 
threshold amount.161 This levy also is subject to various legal challenges, 
the most important of which is its incompatibility with tax treaties; 
proponents argue that treaties do not apply to the levy since it is not 
targeting net income, yet it will be difficult to distinguish the levy from 
withholding taxes that are universally accepted as taxes in lieu of income 
taxes.162 Moreover, if the levy is not subject to tax treaties’ rules it should 
not benefit from tax relief in the country of the taxpayer, resulting in 
double taxation. Discussions with Indian officials reveal that the levy was 
enacted out of frustration with the inability of India to expand the PE rules 
within BEPS to include digital presence: India will allow MNE to avoid 
the levy by declaring PE in India, applying the normal attribution rules, 
and India even seems to prefer a negotiated (hopefully treaty-based) 
solution that will allow it to impose sufficient source based taxation.163 
The European Commission, as already mentioned, made on March 21, 
2018 a proposal for an interim digital services tax (DST) at a rate of 3% 
on income from the supply of certain services, including: advertising, 
transmission of data collected about users which has been generated from 
such users’ activities on digital interfaces, and “intermediation services” 
or online platform, all based on meaningful user participation in the 
creation of value from the relevant services, which is the justification for 
the source/destination based tax.164 The DST is intended to relieve the 
                                                                                                                     
 157.  See OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, 
supra note 23, at 143. 
 158.  The idea of the equalization levy was presented by the final action 1 report. See OECD, 
ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 23, at 115-17. 
 159.  Chapter VIII of Finance Act, 2016. See, e.g., Sagar Wagh, The Taxation of Digital 
Transactions in India: The New Equalization Levy, 70 BULL. INT’L TAX. 538 (2016). 
 160.  ITO v. Right Florist Pvt. Ltd., I.T.A. No. 1336/Kol./2011. 
 161.  See, e.g., Wagh, The Taxation of Digital Transactions in India: The New Equalization 
Levy, supra note 159. 
 162.  See, e.g., Amar Mehta, Equalization Levy Proposal in Indian Finance Bill 2016: Is It 
Legitimate Tax Policy or an Attempt at Treaty Dodging, 22 ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. 2 (2016). 
 163.  See, e.g., Marnix Schellekens, Report on Seminar H: Recent developments in 
international taxation in IFA’s 70th Congress in Madrid (IBFD Online, Sept. 26, 2016). 
 164.  COM(2018) 148 Final. 
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pressure on and from EU Member States to tax the digital economy while 
a global standard solution is being negotiated.165 The DST is essentially 
equivalent to the Indian equalization tax, yet in the European context it 
suffered from ample criticism about its legality and political wisdom,166 
especially when presented as an interim measures, eventually voted down 
by the Member States, yet not disappeared as the European Parliament 
launched a new initiative to revive the proposal in an expanded form.167 
The United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Austria announced that they 
will adopt domestic versions of the DST.168 One can observe the pressure 
on governments and international organizations “to do something” about 
taxing the digital economy, and the easiest thing to do is to impose a 
gross-based, roughly defined, new tax that has the optics of strong 
political response even when its legality is cast in doubt, a matter that 
would be resolved in the less pressing future. The typical tagging of these 
measures as interim measures fits such tactics, yet, it is disingenuous, 
since once interim measures are in place there will be less political will 
to push for implementation of the permanent, consensus based measures, 
and, more importantly, it is unclear how long will it take to reach such 
consensus, if possible at all, reminding us of the cliché about temporary 
measures being the most permanent of all. Turnover taxes, similar to the 
equalization levy in all relevant aspects were also enacted in a few 
countries, such as Argentina169 and France.170 Finally, other countries 
adopted different measures that involve the taxation of the digital 
economy, yet in forms other than the more comprehensive solutions on 
the international agenda.171 
Although beyond the scope of this Article,172 various countries 
adopted new rules for taxing the digital economy with their VAT,173 some 
                                                                                                                     
 165.  Id. 
166.   See, e.g., Georg Kofler & Julia Sinnig, Equalization Taxes and the EU’s ‘Digital 
Services Tax,’ 47 INTERTAX 176 (2019). 
 167.  See, e.g., Teri Sprackland, European Parliament Votes for Strong Digital Services Tax, 
2018 WTD 241-10 (Dec. 14, 2018). 
 168.  As did Korea, outside the European Union, see, e.g., William Hoke, Austria to 
Introduce Digital Services Tax, 2019 WTD 1-2 (Jan. 2, 2019). See also Alvaro de Juan Ledesma, 
Spain: Digital services tax approved by government, IBFD Online (Jan. 24, 2019). 
 169.  Imposed at the provincial level, see, e.g., Jimena Milessi, Argentina’s Journey to a 
Digital VAT, 90 TAX NOTES INT’L 47 (2018). 
 170.  Imposed on transfers of audio-visual content, see OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING 
FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 146. 
171.  See, e.g., Romero J.S. Tavares & Aline Dias, What will a Post-BEPS Latin America 
Look Like?, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 551 (2016) (discussing Chile adopting extensive reporting 
requirement pertaining to the digital economy).  
 172.  See infra Part III.E. 
 173.  See, e.g., Slim Gargouri, Argentina Enacts VAT Rules for Nonresidents’ Digital 
Services, 2018 WTD 88-14 (May 7, 2018);  
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following the OECD work on similar measures.174 
B. The Nexus Approach 
The term “nexus” is somewhat imprecise,175 yet in effect the use of 
the term became widespread in reliance on an implied nexus between an 
item of income and a territory to broaden the traditional PE concept 
contained in article 5 of both the OECD and the UN Model Tax 
Conventions. Article 5 already includes physical and personal  extensions 
to the PE concept, contained in articles 5(1) to 5(3) and 5(5) of the 
Models, all of which could also be considered manifestations of the  
nexus approach,176 yet in the context of the taxation of the digital 
economy the term “nexus approach” refers to the various initiatives to 
include (at both treaty and domestic law level) an extended concept of 
Virtual PE or Significant Economic (Digital) Presence and corresponding 
rules for attributing profits to such newly created PE. 
1. The Virtual PE Solution 
Despite the terminology, the Significant Economic Presence rule is 
really about modifying the PE concept for the digital age, suggesting that 
there can be a virtual PE, meaning a PE that is fully dissociated from the 
current physical and personal presence requirements that have 
traditionally characterized PE. The existence of a Virtual PE could 
hypothetically depend on:(1) a revenue factor identified, with a 
(preferably) high177 threshold of gross revenues generated from remote 
transactions,178 calculated on a group basis;179 combined with either (2) 
digital factors either in the form of local domain names, local digital 
platforms or local payment options;180 or (3) user-based factors, such as 
monthly active users, online contract conclusion or data collected.181 
This new definition of a Virtual PE is actually not much different from 
that proposed in recent academic work,182 in the ‘2018 EU Significant 
                                                                                                                     
 174. OECD, INTERNATIONAL VAT/GST GUIDELINES (Apr. 12, 2017). 
175.  And, to make things worse, is often used in the context of U.S. state and local taxation. 
176.  As well as the common “service PE” provisions, such as article 12A of the UN Model. 
177.  Intended to minimize administrative burdens for tax administrations, as well as 
compliance burdens for the taxpayer. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE 
DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 108. 
178.  A reference to ‘digital’ transactions is avoided in order not to treat other ‘remote’ 
transactions (mail-order or telephone transactions) differently. Id. 
179.  A separate-entity basis should be avoided in order to prevent artificial fragmentation of 
distance selling activities. Id. 
180.  Id. at 109. 
181.  Id. at 110-11. 
182.  Hongler and Pistone refer to the provision of digital services used by more than one 
thousand monthly users if the total amount of revenue due to the aforementioned services in the 
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Digital Presence Directive Proposal’183 and, to a lesser extent, by national 
regulation referring to Virtual PEs.184 
The proposal has significant advantages and continues to be on the 
official agenda of the OECD,185 yet a Virtual PE entails serious technical 
drawbacks as well. The breach of the continuity requirement (i.e., the 
non-existence of a PE leads from full to zero taxation), that is present in 
traditional physical and personal PEs, would become even more dramatic 
in the new nexus, where the lack of a single threshold unit (day, dollar, 
user or consumer) could lead from full taxation of income attributable to 
the Virtual PE to no source taxation at all.186 Additionally shaping the 
threshold(s) upon which the concept of Virtual PE is based is a difficult 
task;187 as a result, the final rules would be complex and difficult to 
                                                                                                                     
other Contracting State exceed a yet-to-be-determined minimum turnover. Hongler & Pistone, 
Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of Digital Economy, supra note 
17). In fact, their proposal combines a revenue factor with a user-based factor. See also Yariv 
Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models: 
Two Proposals for the European Union, 71 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 681, 683 (2017) [hereinafter 
Brauner & Pistone, Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models]. 
183.  Article 4(3) of the ‘2018 EU Significant Digital Presence Directive Proposal’ provides 
that ‘significant digital presence’ shall be considered to exist in a Member State if digital services 
are provided through a digital interface and one or more of the following conditions is met: (a) 
the proportion of total revenues obtained in that tax period and resulting from the supply of those 
digital services to users located in that Member State in that tax period exceeds EUR 7,000,000; 
(b) the number of users of one or more of those digital services who are located in that Member 
State in that tax period exceeds 100,000; (c) the number of business contracts for the supply of 
any such digital service that is concluded in that tax period by users located in that Member State 
exceeds 3,000. 
184.  On February 1, 2018 the Indian Finance Minister presented the country’s then-latest 
budget containing a new sourcing rule that referred to SEP based upon two alternative factors: (1) 
the aggregate of payments arising from a transaction carried out by a non-resident during the 
financial year exceeding a yet-to-be-prescribed amount or (2) systematic and continuous soliciting 
of business activities or engaging in interactions with a yet-to-be-prescribed number of Indian 
users through digital means. For its part, the Indian budget proposal defined SEP by, alternatively: 
(a) a mere revenue factor (on a transaction by transactions basis) or (b) a combination of a user-
based factor and a totally undefined concept of ‘continuous soliciting of business.’ The Indian 
Significant Economic Presence threshold has been rightly criticized for its vagueness and 
ambiguity. See Shilpa Goel, Indian 2018 Budget: New Nexus to Tax Based on Virtual Presence, 
KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 5, 2018), available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/02/05/ 
indian-2018-budget-new-nexus-tax-based-virtual-presence/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). Israel 
effectively adopted a Virtual PE solution as well. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50. 
185.  PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119. 
186.  For more on the continuity approach and the avoidance of the all-or-nothing rule, even 
if unrelated to a VPE, see Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best 
World (Part I), 1 WORLD TAX J. 67, 99-101 (2009). For the same reasoning regarding service PE 
or virtual PE, see Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper, 
supra note 26, at 18. 
187. For a good description of these difficulties, see Daniel. W. Blum, Permanent 
Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined?,, 69 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 314, 322-23 (2015) 
[hereinafter Blum, Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative].  
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interpret. Rules defining thresholds in relation to existing proposals on 
Virtual PEs have been criticized for being vague and ambiguous,188 and, 
at the same time, a nightmare of complexity and uncertainty.189 In the 
same vein, thresholds, particularly revenue- or user-based factors, may 
be easy for a potential taxpayer to avoid, which will, inevitably, lead to 
such thresholds being designed on a related-group basis rather than on a 
separate-entity basis190 and, for any domestic sales thresholds, to the 
application of anti-avoidance rules to address artificial (or resale) 
arrangements with non-group members.191 Although theoretically 
effective for ensuring the integrity of the system, such rules would add 
complexity to already-cumbersome threshold rules. Due to all the above 
it is evident that Virtual PEs pose major challenges with regard to 
compliance and enforcement. Indeed, according to current proposals 
defining significant digital presence, the state in which the PE is located 
should become aware and be able to control that a non-resident taxpayer 
effectively exceeds the threshold(s) upon which the very concept of PE 
is based and, once this has been done, to also control the income 
generated and attributable to that significant digital presence.  In the 
context of a company with no physical presence in the source state this 
might prove extraordinarily problematic. 
However, the above are just minor problems in comparison to what 
has been labelled as the Achilles’ heel of all of the current proposals that 
favour a new Virtual PE:192 the attribution of profits to whatever newly 
created Permanent Establishment. These problems merit separate 
                                                                                                                     
188. In relation to the new Indian nexus to be taxed on virtual presence, see Goel, supra note 
184. 
189. In relation to the 2018 EU DST Directive Proposal, see Johannes Becker & Joachim 
English, EU Digital Services Tax: A Populist and Flawed Proposal, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG 
(Mar. 16, 2018). 
190. As recognized by OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 108, and by OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING 
FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 188, for revenue-based factors. 
Both the 2018 EU Significant Digital Presence Directive Proposal, art. 4(3) and the 2018 EU 
Digital Service Tax Directive Proposal, art. 4(6), follow this recommendation. See supra notes 
155 & 164. 
191. Recognized by OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM 
REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 188-89, for domestic sales thresholds. 
192. See, e.g., Li, Protecting the Tax Base in a Digital Economy, supra note 75, at 445; Blum, 
Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting Initiative,  supra note 187, at 322-23; Kofler et al., Taxation of the Digital 
Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, supra note 72, at 529; DALE PINTO, E-
COMMERCE AND SOURCE-BASED INCOME TAXATION 322 (2003); Schön, Ten Questions about Why 
and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 22; Matteo Cataldi, The Attribution of 
Income to a Digital Permanent Establishment, in TAXATION IN A GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 143, 
149 (Ina Kerschner & Maryte Somare eds., 2017); Adolfo Martín Jiménez, BEPS, the 
Digital(ized) Economy and the Taxation of Services and Royalties, 46 INTERTAX 620, 624 (2018); 
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 23, at 111-12. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347503 
46 TAXING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY POST BEPS . . .  SERIOUSLY [2019 
 
consideration. 
2. Focus on Profit Attribution Rules  
Proposals based on the nexus approach originally focused on the 
reframing of the traditional nexus (or PE) rules to accommodate taxable 
presence based not only on physical but also on virtual presence. The 
entire BEPS work until 2018 essentially ignored the complementary 
profit attribution rules that actually determine the new tax base created 
by the reform of the rules.193 
On January 29, 2019, the OECD published a policy note on behalf of 
the inclusive framework concerning the taxation of the digital 
economy,194 followed by a Public Consultation Document, published on 
Feb. 12, 2019,195 in which it did an about-face, shifting the focus to the 
profit allocation rules. The consultation document includes some vague, 
diplomatic language stating in addition that all it says is “on a without 
prejudice basis,” and continuing the commitment to not ring-fence the 
digital economy. It is clear that it responds to pressure by a few powerful 
OECD members to change course from the solutions explored by the final 
action 1 report:196 the U.S. and U.K. proposals that focus on the profit 
allocation rules, and the German/French minimum tax proposal.197  
The policy note states that the purpose of the work on these two 
solutions is to counter unilateral actions by states, actions that would 
threaten the stability of the international tax regime to the detriment of 
all.198 Unfortunately, the transparent concession to the most powerful 
nations in the OECD is likely to further weaken the international tax 
regime, since it signals continuance of the snub of developing countries 
and their interests in general, and also the fundamental requirement for a 
fairer division of tax bases in particular. The proposals are not detailed 
and therefore could not be comprehensively analyzed, yet a few 
observations could be made, none of which are flattering to the proposals. 
                                                                                                                     
193.  On the scarce previous work of the OECD on attribution of profits to a newly created 
Digital PE, see, e.g., Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67.  
 194. Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy—Policy Note (Jan. 
23, 2019), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/policy-note-beps-inclusive-framework-
addressing-tax-challenges-digitalisation.pdf [hereinafter Addressing the Tax Challenges of the 
Digitalisation of the Economy]. 
 195. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119. 
 196. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 23. 
 197.  See infra Part III.G. The Public Consultation Document includes a lip service to a third 
solution it names: the “significant economic presence” proposal, which suggests that it will 
continue to work on the virtual PE solution, yet this proposal is drafted in vague and non-
committing language and does not include the analysis that the document engaged in, even if 
preliminarily, with respect to the other two proposals. 
 198. Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra note 194. 
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The refocusing on profit allocation gives one the impression that the 
consultation document maintains the nexus approach, or the virtual PE as 
a viable solution. It provides no technical details that are cardinal for any 
assessment of a threshold rule based on the nexus approach and the 
condition for its success.199 The proposal simply shifts the focus to the 
profit allocation question, using the value creation mantra to camouflage 
the fact that it proposes no solution for the basic nexus question.200  
The U.K. proposal, renamed as the “user participation” proposal,201 
calls for an amendment of the profit allocation rules to take account of 
user participation in the user’s country.202 The proposal is to permit 
countries where certain users truly provide a benefit to certain businesses 
of the type that significantly benefit from the contribution of users, such 
as social media platforms, to automatically declare nexus and require 
allocation of some profits to such nexus with the view of having 
consequent jurisdiction to tax such profits. The proposal does not extend 
the rule to all businesses but rather only to those significantly benefiting 
from said user participation, an obvious ring-fencing exercise that 
violates what was supposed to be the one ground rule that could not be 
broken.  
Another, perhaps the most serious difficulty presented by this 
proposal is that despite the rhetoric about shifting focus to the profit 
allocation rules it does not offer any insight into how that could 
practically be done. The proposal acknowledges that the ALS could not 
be applied, suggesting instead the use of residual profit split with the final 
residual profit (the “upside”) allocated based on a pre-agreed formula. It 
is unclear how this proposal will fare with the arm’s length orthodoxy in 
the OECD when it comes to specify the detailed rules,203 yet what is clear 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Despite the fact that one viable proposal was made and later discussed in multiple fora, 
it has never been fully adopted (neither has a different proposal been adopted) or elaborated on in 
the BEPS context. See Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income 
in the Era of the Digital Economy, supra note 17, at 2. 
 200.  As explained below, the proposal mentions that it would be possible to apply the profit 
allocation rules automatically, which means without determining nexus first, in what is effectively 
formulary taxation of business income, a solution supported by many (see, e.g., Yariv Brauner, 
Formula Based Transfer Pricing, in THE PROPER TAX BASE: STRUCTURAL FAIRNESS FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL MCDANIEL 149 
(Yariv Brauner & Martin M. McMahon eds., 2012) yet repeatedly dismissed by the OECD. See 
OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, 28, 43 (2017), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecd-
transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
 201.  See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 9. 
 202.  U.K. Proposal, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/corporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_
update_web.pdf. 
 203.  See Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra note 
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is that the proposal results in very little shifting of revenue to source 
jurisdictions, especially to poor jurisdictions.  
The proposal requires many threshold decisions which will determine 
its impact. This requirement is unlikely to garner support among 
developing countries lacking trust in a project that had ignored their needs 
to date. These are the same countries that have rejected mandatory 
arbitration as a solution for the lacking dispute resolution mechanism of 
the current international tax regime based on a similar lack of trust.  
Ironically, the proposal emphasizes that its success depends on a 
strong dispute resolution component, but it fails to mention that such 
component does not exist.204 Similarly, the proposal ignores the cost of 
enforcement and administration of such a complex norm which 
immediately disadvantages the less wealthy countries, and as market 
economies, will make them dependent on information that is primarily at 
the disposal of the residence countries or that the residence countries will 
more simply cheaply obtain through the goodwill of such countries in the 
exchange of such information.205 Finally, the proposal definitely does not 
resolve the challenges presented by digital businesses that do not depend 
on user participation of the sort mentioned in the U.K. proposal.206 
The theoretical justification of the United Kingdom is also debatable. 
It does provide an intuitively appealing rationale for taxation at the source 
in the absence of physical presence, yet one wonders whether such 
rationale could and should be translated into an operative rule or simply 
support the fairness and legitimacy need to augment source taxation. If 
the latter, then it is useful to garner support for different solutions that 
increase source taxation, most of all for the virtual PE proposal.  
As an operative rule, however, it faces a few difficulties: first, user 
involvement may not be viewed as unique in the context of the digital 
economy. The extent of active user involvement in the digital economy 
and the active production of content by users may be viewed as 
sufficiently more intensive in the digital economy to justify qualitative 
distinction from user involvement in the non-digital economy. If this is 
the argument for an operative rule it could only serve to tax at the source 
a minor segment of that economy making this indeed consistent with the 
U.K. proposal. 
The focus on user involvement in this context is arbitrary in the sense 
that one could think of other ways that digital economy firms can get 
                                                                                                                     
194. 
 204.  See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 11. 
 205.  The Public Consultation Document briefly mentions in the last sentence that work will 
be done to reduce the administrative burden yet does not provide any detail on the matter. Id. 
 206.  See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining about the primacy of B2B in the relevant markets and 
the mistaken focus on the more visible B2C paradigm that must be the basis for the user 
participation proposal). See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 10.  
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involved in the economy of a source country without physical presence 
as demonstrated by the marketing intangibles. Moreover, both the U.S. 
and the U.K. proposals are conservative (assuming one is neutral about 
the political origins of both proposals) in the sense that they accept 
physical presence as the benchmark trigger for source taxation, using 
digital proxies for that benchmark rather than rethinking it. One could 
think about another way of doing the same thing: analogizing the digital 
business as a whole to a comparable non-digital business. That solution 
seems too obscure and therefore cannot be proposed in such general terms 
yet it is exactly what the U.S. and the U.K. proposals attempt to do, just 
in a more genuine form.  
A second difficulty of the user involvement ideas is its necessary 
reliance on the value creation notion.207 This may be viewed as positive 
because that notion is pushed by the OECD as a new foundation of 
international taxation. However, the notion has received cool reception 
once it had to be translated into derivative rules,208 which casts doubt on 
the practicality of a user involvement rule. A third difficulty of the user 
involvement ideas is its intuitive, yet misled reliance on the benefit 
principle to assess taxation at the source. This difficulty pertains to the 
idea that users in the digital economy perform productive functions to 
such an extent that they should be compensated for them.  
Becker and Englisch, wrote an article that genuinely attempts to 
advance the discussion of this idea toward a practical solution. The article 
suggests an attempt to distinguish between most instances of user 
involvement that they admit is essentially passive (i.e., does not 
distinguish the digital economy). In those special cases where three 
conditions are met: (1) stable user relationship, (2) use of the relationship 
in the firm’s value creation, and (3) user network being a sufficient size 
or intensity, Becker and Englisch conclude that nexus could be 
declared.209 This does not extend to the appropriate profit allocation to 
such nexus, a conclusion that does not fall prey to the confusion between 
following the benefit principle for justification of taxation and using the 
principle to calculate the tax, unfortunately, the OECD and the U.K. 
proposal were not so careful. As to the Becker and Englisch proposal, as 
such, it is too early to assess it. Without a detailed proposal, one could 
                                                                                                                     
 207.  See Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created, supra note 52, at 166-70. 
 208.  See, e.g., Jonathan Schwarz, Value Creation: Old wine in new bottles or new wine in 
old bottles?, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (May 21, 2018), available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/ 
2018/05/21/value-creation-old-wine-new-bottles-new-wine-old-bottles/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2019); Allison Christians, Taxing According to Value Creation, 90 TAX NOTES INT’L 1379 (2018); 
Marcel Olbert & Christoph Spengel, International Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge 
Accepted?, 9 WORLD TAX J. 3 (2017); and Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Value Creation as 
the Fundamental Principle of the International Corporate Tax System (July 31, 2018) (disputing 
the wisdom of relying on “value creation” as a principle for taxing the digital economy). 
 209.  Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created, supra note 52, at 171. 
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not compare it to other nexus establishing proposals.210 As a nexus 
establishing proposal, this Article argues that it is likely to be inferior to 
the withholding solution explained above.211             
The U.S. proposal, not yet fully exposed in an official document of 
that government,212 uses the same general approach as the U.K. proposal 
but with a view to apply it to all businesses, avoiding the ring-fencing 
trap. This proposal views the participation of a business in the source 
economy in the form of the development of marketing intangibles that 
makes a link to the market economy sufficient to justify taxation by the 
latter.213 The justification is built on the inherent relationship between 
marketing intangibles and the market economy, a type of relationship that 
cannot, according to the proposal be identified for other intangibles 
(intangibles being the productive assets in question since other assets 
would naturally end up related to physical presence in the market country 
if they were to create value in such country) and therefore justifies 
reliance on marketing intangibles as triggers for taxation by the market 
country.214 
 This proposal is more sophisticated than the user participation 
proposal (in concept—we have not seen a detailed proposal): first, it 
avoids ring-fencing; second, it does not reformulate the PE definition but 
rather suggests to alternatively allocate profits to marketing intangibles 
automatically (once a marketing intangible is identified, it is qualified for 
profit attribution) in a manner analogous to allocation of profits to a PE; 
third, although it is not decisive about it, the proposal essentially suggests 
to use the current transfer pricing rules, in their current format, with the 
post-BEPS emphasis on residual profit split to determine proper 
allocation rather than fall into the formulary allocation trap. The 
uncommitted language demonstrates an understanding that this exercise 
will be difficult to implement and even more difficult to standardize, so 
an alternative reliance on “formulaic approaches” based on “mechanical 
approximations” is suggested for further study.215  
The advantages of the marketing intangibles proposal over the user 
participation proposal do not extend however to the fundamental 
requirement of a fairer division of tax bases. Similarly to the U.K. 
proposal, it will clearly result in little shifting of profits to source 
jurisdictions and may even result in an even less fair division of tax bases 
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than the current regime since the richest countries may claim, as the 
United States has been claiming for a while—that was the reason for the 
invention of the marketing intangible concept in the first place—that 
more profit needs to be allocated to them rather than to traditional source 
jurisdictions.216 Even more obviously, the more powerful and more 
sophisticated jurisdictions will have more resources to fully implement 
these difficult to implement rules. Another similarity between the 
marketing intangibles and the user participation proposals is the 
statement that their success depends on strong dispute resolution,217 a 
disingenuous statement as already explained.218 Finally, similarly to the 
user participation proposal, the marketing intangibles proposal does not 
have any comprehensive theoretical basis, being merely one of many 
options to partially tax the digital economy at the source, ignoring the 
“bigger picture” fairness and legitimacy requirement from a solution to 
this problem. 
C. Equalization Levies 
The third alternative mentioned in the final BEPS action 1 report, 
resembled the withholding option being source-based and generally 
levied on gross income, yet it differed from both the withholding and the 
nexus-based solution as anew tax to be introduced, outside the current 
regime.219 Typically, equalization levies were introduced as interim 
solution or quick fixes to pressures related to non-taxation of the digital 
economy.220 Interim solutions are generally undesirable, yet particularly 
undesirable at the present when there is still some political momentum to 
reach a global solution to the challenges that the digital economy present 
to the international tax regime, a global solution that is necessary for a 
challenge that is global in essence. The mobility inherent to the digital 
economy and the interdependence of countries’ economies in its context 
necessitate a standard solution that would result in acceptable division of 
the tax base, assuming that countries still wish to refrain from double 
taxation. Interim solutions distract countries from participation in the 
global effort, increase biases since amending existing rules may seem 
costlier to countries than adopting a new rule, and diminish adopting 
countries perceived benefits from a universal solution. Moreover, the 
global effort towards a universal solution may not succeed, leaving 
                                                                                                                     
 216.  For a concise history and explanation of the politics involved, see, e.g., Marc M. Levey, 
Philip W. Carmichael, Imke Gerdes, & Daniel A. Rosen, Marketing Intangibles — The Expanding 
Global Analysis 27 J. INT’L TAX’N 20 (2016). 
 217.  See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 16. 
 218.  See supra text accompanying note 204. 
 219.  See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 220.  See Mehta, supra note 162. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347503 
52 TAXING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY POST BEPS . . .  SERIOUSLY [2019 
 
countries with interim measures that they had not originally considered 
and analyzed as final or long-term measures, making them manifestly 
sub-optimal. 
Pragmatically, some of the levies are applied by recruitment of the 
domestic payers through either a mechanism akin to withholding taxes or 
special reporting requirements. They are therefore substantively identical 
to withholding taxes, which means that first, they are not administratively 
superior to the withholding solution, and, second, that the claim that they 
are outside the scope of tax treaties based on Model Article 2 is weak.221 
In any event, they are less likely to be considered creditable at the relevant 
residence countries than withholding taxes, either because the treaty 
would not be considered applicable to them or because their design is not 
sufficiently similar to other creditable taxes. 
Playing outside the rules of the game is costly for the international tax 
regime,222 and so are equalization levies that present a myriad of potential 
conflicts with international laws, primarily EU and tax treaties laws that 
the withholding solution does not present.223 
In conclusion, on all grounds (leaving speculative political 
considerations) the withholding solution is superior to the equalization 
levies solution.  
D. Turnover Taxes 
Turnover taxes resemble the equalization levies in all respects, yet 
they tend to be designated as such when applied to particular sectors or 
types of income.224 These taxes are conceptually indistinguishable from 
the equalization levies and therefore the same critique is applicable to 
them.225 
E. Value Added Taxes 
Corporate income taxation was not the only concern of BEPS action 
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1: “Issues to be examined include . . . how to ensure the effective 
collection of VAT/GST with respect to the cross-border supply of digital 
goods and services.”226 The relationship between direct and indirect 
taxation poses numerous and interesting theoretical and practical 
problems, yet this Article, to be pragmatic, accepts the dominant 
approach analyzing them separately in the same way that actual 
policymakers, including the BEPS project, do.  
This Article wishes to address, however, two issues related to this 
choice of approach. First, the withholding solution (and the nexus 
approach at that) was criticized that it de facto creates a quasi indirect 
tax,227 a claim that may be viewed as meaningless in our world where 
policies related to the mix of taxes are simply not considered by 
politicians. Yet, as already explained by Doernberg with respect to the 
withholding solution,228 first, the withholding tax may be creditable in the 
residence state and hence should not increase the overall tax burden on 
digital transactions, and, second, the withholding solution retains the 
right for the taxpayer to file on a net basis in the source country (if the 
withholding tax burden exceeds the tax burden on net income attributable 
to activities in that country). Second, the mechanisms of the withholding 
solution and of a VAT should work in support of each other in the digital 
economy. Particularly the option to register in the source country should 
correspond well to the VAT registration requirements and the 
withholding solution’s information exchange mechanism, through the 
standardization of reporting on both taxpayers and transactions should 
equally be useful for the enforcement of a VAT, if any. 
F. The DBCFT 
 The destination based cash flow tax (DBCFT) is essentially a 
VAT with a separate, progressive wage tax. It is similar to past proposals 
to replace the U.S. corporate tax and hence required to avoid being 
branded as a VAT, assuming that such branding would make any 
proposal politically infeasible.229 It has been promoted by Professor Mike 
Devereux and co-authored in various forms and occasions in recent 
years.230 In 2017, Devereux and co-author Professor John Vella, argued 
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that the DBCFT is superior to other international tax reform proposals to 
tackle the challenges presented by the digital economy.231 Much of their 
analysis conceptually resembles the analysis of this article: the analysis 
recognizes the inability of the current rules to effectively tax the digital 
economy, the DBCFT does not ring-fence the digital economy, it is a 
destination based tax (although the motivation of the DBCFT is 
efficiency based, while the withholding solution is primarily driven by 
fairness, legitimacy and effectiveness of the tax), it works best for B2B 
while suggesting that B2C could be handled using similar measures in 
combination with regulatory requirements of facilitating financial 
institutions 
Despite the similar approaches, and the merits of the DBCFT as a 
policy alternative, it goes beyond the scope of the analysis of this article 
since it would replace the corporate income tax which preservation was 
a basic condition of the BEPS project and this article. Note that this 
condition is not merely technical; playing outside “the rules of the game” 
should open a much wider discussion that requires evaluation of the risks 
involved in a more fundamental reform, especially destabilization of the 
international tax regime and conflict with other international legal 
regimes, such as the WTO.232 From the perspective of the taxation of the 
digital economy the withholding solution achieves much of the same 
benefits by playing within the rules of the game, and therefore is also 
more likely to gain legitimacy than the DBCFT that has not been 
welcomed by any country to date.233 
An additional advantage of the withholding solution over the DBCFT 
is its actual division of the tax base among market and residence 
countries, division reflected in the relative low rate of withholding and 
the use of withholding which is a universally accepted tax “in lieu of an 
income tax”234 and therefore acceptable for double tax relief even in 
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credit jurisdictions. The DBCFT is the only and final tax proposed. 
Devereux and Vella acknowledge what they call the arbitrariness of 
taxing solely based on destination, yet, they provide a few justifications 
for pursuing the tax regardless: the location of customer-based 
intangibles usually at the source country, benefit principle justifications 
for taxation at source (destination in their case), the curtailing of the race 
to the bottom triggered by tax competition, and the realization that 
allocation of taxing rights is largely arbitrary anyway. This article agrees 
with these observations yet notes that beyond support of taxation at 
source these observations do not disprove of residual residence taxation 
for which the DBCFT does not provide.235  
Finally, Devereux and Vella answer a potential challenge to the 
DBCFT based on a scenario when a payment is made in one country yet 
the related economic activity/customers are located in another country, 
arguing that the practical and conceptual difficulties of taxing such 
economic activity are significant, probably making such taxation 
prohibitive. This scenario is related to the user participation problem 
when it comes in isolation from payments and the direct answers to that 
problem based on a nexus approach. Like Devereux and Vella, this article 
does not dismiss such taxation in principle, yet argues that the mentioned 
difficulties seem prohibitive at the present and that the withholding 
solution is therefore superior, adding that user activity without payment 
and hence without taxing rights may be viewed as problematic yet it may 
not be significantly distortive (from a tax base division perspective)236 
and it does not present a base erosion problem.    
G. GILTI & Co.237 
The recent TFDE Public Consultation Document states that the OECD 
is now working on a second solution,238 suggested by the French and 
German governments,239 and is fashioned after the so-called GILTI rules 
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adopted in 2017 by the United States in TJCA.240 The solution, called the 
“Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal” is a minimum tax imposed by the 
residence country of a corporate taxpayer on income of foreign branches 
and entities controlled by the taxpayer when the branch of controlled 
entity’s country does not tax or has low-taxes on such income.241  
GILTI is a minimum (yet final) flat tax on foreign income of U.S. 
Shareholders that is not otherwise already taxed in the United States.242 
It was presented as a tax on profit shifting of intangibles, hence the GILTI 
acronym (for “Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income). Its design points 
to a different policy: expansion of the U.S. worldwide income taxation, 
in line with minimum tax on foreign income proposals that have been 
promoted for many years by politicians from both sides of the aisle with 
no success until the passage of TJCA.243 The attraction of the U.S. reform, 
done unilaterally without regard to the global cooperation efforts in the 
BEPS context, to other developed countries, particularly to countries 
where multiple, large MNE reside, was in its legitimation of the capture 
of more foreign profits in the guise of an anti-profit shifting measure.      
Indeed, the Public Consultation Document explicitly states the 
purpose of the work on this solution is to address concerns of the rich 
countries about the lack of focus of prior TFDE work on profit shifting.244 
The basic idea is that MNE will be taxed at a minimum level on a non-
deferral basis by their residence jurisdiction, and therefore should not 
have the incentive to shift profits to low-taxed jurisdictions. The proposal 
naturally shifts taxes to residence rather than to source jurisdictions, 
defying, similarly to the other solutions considered by the OECD, the 
fundamental goal of fairer division of tax jurisdiction and more source 
taxation. To ostensibly balance the distributional implications of the 
minimum tax, the proposal accompanies it with a denial of deductions (or 
treaty benefits) to base-eroding payments not sufficiently taxed.   
The real devil however is truly in the details of such a proposal: it 
would require a set of decisions, each of which will be politically 
contentious and result in significant impact on different countries (what 
is sufficient taxation at the source, for example). Who decides which 
countries win and which lose? The response of the OECD to the richest 
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countries in the Public Consultation Document, shifting the work of the 
TFDE to their proposals and abandoning prior, more balanced options, 
raises the concern that the old bias in favor of residence, primarily OECD,  
raised its head again at the BEPS project. The biased response further 
dismantles the international tax regime as developing (and other) 
countries with an ability to respond will continue to act unilaterally. This 
has been clearly demonstrated by past unilateral actions, such as India’s 
equalization levy.245  
Note also that this proposal is complementary to the BEPS work on 
action 3 and the push for standard, universal CFC rules,246 which was 
basically rejected by BEPS stakeholders and should fare worse in the 
inclusive framework.247 Such an attempt to bring this idea in the backdoor 
via the action 1 work is both disingenuous and unlikely to convince its 
original opponents. Supporters of the proposal may argue that it is, like 
the GILTI rules, complementary to the CFC rules, and would operate in 
symbiosis with them, side-by-side. However, CFC rules are very 
different in different countries and many countries do not use them, 
making the proposal incompatible with most countries’ tax systems. One 
of the reasons for not adopting CFC legislation or adopting minimal CFC 
legislation is the cost of enforcement and the sophistication required by 
revenue agents auditing MNE on deferred income, which obviously 
disadvantages the poorer countries and make such legislation often 
wasteful for them. This proposal should be similarly unattractive to such 
countries, and therefore cannot expect to receive their support.      
The complementary anti base erosion element does not compensate 
for the unattractive impact of the minimum tax on source countries: first, 
because it requires the source jurisdictions to deny a deduction, consistent 
with the anti-hybrids rule of BEPS action 2.248 This rule is very 
problematic and unlikely to be in the interest of developing countries that 
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starve for foreign investment. It will complicate the source country’s tax 
system (i.e., a domestic entity doing exactly the same thing and claiming 
the exact same expense will get the deduction for it while the equivalent 
foreign investor will not). Second, a heavy administrative burden is 
imposed on the source jurisdiction, most importantly to determine 
whether the payment is subject to sufficient taxation in the payment’s 
target jurisdiction. Better cooperation among jurisdictions, including 
more effective exchange of information about taxation of cross-border 
payments would be a valiant goal, but it could not be made the sole 
responsibility of the source jurisdiction. The withholding solution 
achieves more with less burden on the source jurisdictions, and with an 
inherent interest for residence jurisdictions to cooperate as well. In 
conclusion, this solution is clearly inferior to the withholding solution on 
the base erosion front and clearly unacceptable in terms of fairer division 
of taxing rights, having an opposite effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Almost seven years have passed from the launch of the BEPS project 
that is considered by most the most dramatic international tax 
coordination effort, perhaps ever.249 It resulted in unprecedented 
community of over 100 nations participating, and the majority of them 
signing the first (if partial) multilateral tax treaty, the MLI.250 Yet, the 
international community still struggles with what had been the impetus 
for the project—insufficient taxation of the digital economy. The 
technical challenge is significant due to the complexity of the underlined 
transactions and the lack of simple bases for taxation, and most notably 
the insignificance of physical presence, which has been the most 
important basis for taxation of business income in the international tax 
regime. The political challenge however dwarfs the technical challenge 
because simply taxing the digital economy is not enough, countries wish 
to do so and at the same time preserve the international tax regime, the 
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stability it provides to international trade and investment and the ensuing 
economic and political benefits; that could only be done if the regime 
maintained its legitimacy that suffered as emerging economies, most 
importantly the BRICS countries, began, prior to BEPS, to demand voice 
in the setting of the agenda of the regime, and fairer allocation of taxing 
rights, meaning particularly more source taxation.251 
The geopolitical changes that gave the emerging economies the power 
to make such demands were coupled with economic changes, not the least 
of them was the ascent of the digital economy that left the uncoordinated 
international tax regime highly vulnerable and inadequate, leaving all 
productive countries unable to raise sufficient revenue after the global 
financial crisis, and incapable of implementing unilateral policies to 
change that. Yet, old habits die hard. Within the BEPS project, countries 
with power continuously attempted to improve their relative positions, 
often at the expense of delays in the collaborative effort. Nowhere has 
this been more pronounced than in the work on the challenges presented 
by the digital economy. Multiple solutions and analyses have been 
presented, together with unilateral actions by countries “jumping the gun” 
to improve their own positions, yet at the same time providing insights 
on the various options for reform. The TFDE however seems to have 
leaped from work on one solution to another, with no commitment or 
rigorous work on any of them. The political pressures faced by the TFDE 
are unquestionably massive, yet are they insurmountable? This article 
argues that this is not the case, arguing that the withholding solution it 
advocates is feasible (since it does not require wide consensus over a 
complex web of rules) and currently superior to all other reform options. 
Withholding taxes are the beating heart of source taxation, and the 
only technical solution that would guarantee source taxation of the digital 
economy, which has been the primary goal of the entire BEPS action 1 
exercise, simultaneously maintaining both the legitimacy and the 
integrity of the international tax regime. It tackles the core issues heads 
on and in a transparent manner, using measures familiar and internal to 
the regime, and hence measures that would augment the stability of the 
regime rather than threaten it. Finally, the withholding solution also 
operates “within the system” by addressing the core BEPS challenges, 
base erosion and profit shifting, focusing on the big ticket of B2B 
transactions and refraining from populist pseudo solutions that ring fence 
the digital economy (in violation of the core principle of the BEPS work 
on action 1).  
The key contributions of this Article to the international tax scholarly 
discourse are: first, a demonstration of the necessity of reform, rejecting 
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the conservative approach that advocates mere tweaking of the current 
rules of the international tax regime to face the challenges presented by 
the digital economy; second, the Article is the first to provide a detailed 
prescription for the adoption of a withholding solution, including design 
considerations that no alternative proposal provides; third, the Article is 
the first to provide a comprehensive review and analysis of all the realistic 
reform proposals and actual country actions, ultimately comparing them 
to the withholding solution and demonstrating the superiority of the latter.   
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